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IMPLEMENTING NEPA IN THE AGE OF 
CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
Jayni Foley Hein* & Natalie Jacewicz** 
 
The national government has a crucial role to play in combating climate change, 
yet federal projects continue to constitute a major source of United States greenhouse gas 
emissions. Under the National Environmental Policy Act, agencies must consider the 
environmental impacts of major federal actions before they can move forward. But agencies 
frequently downplay or ignore the climate change impacts of their projects in NEPA analyses, 
citing a slew of technical difficulties and uncertainties. This Article analyzes a suite of the 
most common analytical failures on the part of agencies with respect to climate change: failure 
to account for a project’s downstream and upstream greenhouse gas emissions; failure to 
acknowledge a project’s effect on the country’s energy mix; and failure to consider a reasonable 
social cost of carbon. After summarizing current regulatory practice and case law on each 
topic, this Article finds that despite protestations that accounting for such impacts is infeasible, 
agencies already possess many of the tools needed to assess such impacts, and indeed, some 
agencies already use these tools to do so. Furthermore, courts are increasingly holding agencies 
accountable for a full and fair assessment of climate change effects in NEPA analysis. This 
Article aims to highlight best practices so that agency offices can learn from one another, fulfill 
NEPA’s mandate, and begin to provide leadership in the fight against climate change. 
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York University School of Law. We are grateful to our colleagues at the Institute for Policy Integrity at 
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support during this challenging pandemic year. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Great Divide, whose mountains slice the western sliver of continent 
off the Americas like a crust of bread, breaks its path from Alaska to Patagonia1 at a 
single point: Wyoming’s Red Desert.2 Notwithstanding its desolate name, this 
rupture in the Rockies hosts throngs of wildlife. Made up mostly of unprotected 
federal lands, the area constitutes the largest undeveloped high-elevation desert in 
the United States.3 
 International energy conglomerates have fixed their sights on the region’s 
mineral reserves.4 In 2015, the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) included the 
Red Desert in a bundle of federal land leases made available to oil and gas companies.5 
Sacrificing swaths of wilderness to fossil fuels inevitably entails releasing more 
greenhouse gases (“GHGs”) and exacerbating the global climate change crisis. Yet 
BLM gave only a cursory nod to the GHG emissions that would result from this 
decision.6 Blaming uncertainty around calculating direct and indirect emissions 
caused by oil and gas projects, BLM claimed it could not quantify GHG effects at 
specific sites or in aggregate.7 The agency decided to lease the land anyway.8  
The Red Desert’s fate exemplifies a broader trend: U.S. agencies routinely 
make decisions that have significant climate change implications while failing to 
account for those effects fully—or, in some cases, at all. BLM, for example, held 
twenty-eight lease sales for oil and gas in 2018 alone.9 And even amidst clear market 
signals that coal is no longer in favor,10 the federal government remains the nation’s 
 
1. The Continental Divide Trail, HIKE THE DIVIDE (last visited Jan. 30, 2020), 
http://www.hikethedivide.com/the-trail.  
2. See Red Desert, NATURE CONSERVANCY (last visited Jan. 30, 2020), 
https://www.nature.org/en-us/get-involved/how-to-help/places-we-protect/red-desert/.  
3. The Red Desert & the Great Divide Basin, ULTIMATEWYOMING (last visited Jan. 30, 2020), 
http://www.ultimatewyoming.com/sectionpages/sec5/extras/reddesert.html. 
4. See id. (“[T]he area has long been the focus of multinational oil, gas and mining corporations.”). 
5.  See WildEarth Guardians v. Zinke, 368 F. Supp. 3d 41, 61–62 (D.D.C. 2019) (discussing 
standing of the plaintiffs and noting that the Red Desert “contain[s] land falling within one or both of the 
High Plains and Wind River districts” being leased). 
6. See WildEarth Guardians, 368 F. Supp. 3d at 56 (discussing the EAs’ treatment of climate 
change “on a conceptual level”).  
7. See id.  
8. See id. at 51 (referring to the leases authorized by BLM). 
9. Press Release, Bureau of Land Mgmt., Using the Least Amount of Acreage in History, Interior 
Hits Record Oil and Gas Revenues in 2018 at $1.1 Billion (May 1, 2019), https://www.blm.gov/press-
release/using-least-amount-acreage-history-interior-hits-record-oil-and-gas-revenues-2018-11. 
10. See generally Catherine Morehouse, 2020 Outlook: Coal Faces Headwinds from Aging Plants, 
Adverse Market Signals and High Remediation Costs, UTILITY DRIVE (Jan. 14, 2020), 
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/2020-outlook-coal-faces-headwinds-from-aging-plants-adverse-
market-signal/569732/.  




largest coal producer,11 with roughly 309 million tons of coal produced on federal 
lands in 2018.12 These actions have a correspondingly vast effect on GHG emissions. 
Fossil fuels extracted on federal lands account for 22% of all GHG emissions from 
the United States annually.13  
 Under the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), federal agencies 
must consider the environmental consequences of their projects and disclose their 
findings to the public before the agencies take action.14 Because environmental 
consequences include climate change impacts, agencies must analyze and publish the 
effects of their projects on greenhouse gas emissions.15 Yet agencies frequently claim 
to lack the tools to accurately account for climate change impacts, even while easily 
quantifying expected benefits to industry.16 As a consequence, federal projects 
proceed with massive climate effects that receive little or no examination.17  
The danger of this lack of examination is that cursory and incomplete 
climate information perpetuates the intractable “death by a thousand cuts” nature of 
global warming. The sources of greenhouse gas pollution are myriad, multi-
jurisdictional, and, at present, entwined with modern necessities like electricity and 
transportation.18 And the problem is becoming more serious. Two degrees Celsius of 
 
11. See Phil McKenna, Cheap Federal Coal Supports Largest U.S. Producers, INSIDECLIMATENEWS 
(Mar. 17, 2016), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/16032016/coal-companies-rely-heavily-public-lands-
coal (stating that for the “top three coal companies in the U.S . . . as much as 88 percent of their total 
production [comes] from land owned and leased by the federal government.”). 
12. U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, NATURAL RESOURCES REVENUE DATA, https://revenuedata.doi 
.gov/query-data/?dataType=Production (last visited on Jan. 29, 2020). 
13. See Wilderness Soc’y, Federal Lands Emissions Accountability Tool, https://www.wilderness.org/ 
articles/article/federal-lands-emissions-accountability-tool (last visited Jan. 30, 2020) (“These emissions 
are roughly equivalent to 22% of total U.S. average emissions between 2005 and 2015.”); see also U.S. 
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, FEDERAL LANDS GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SEQUESTRATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES: ESTIMATES FOR 2005-14 7 tbl. 1 (2018) (breaking down several of the significant 
categories of greenhouse gas emissions by fuel type). 
14. See generally National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321; see also 
42 U.S.C. § 4321(C)(ii) (requiring agencies to report on “adverse environmental effects”). 
15. For just a few examples of cases in which courts demand agencies account for greenhouse gases 
under NEPA, see Sierra Club v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 867 F.3d 1357, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2017); San 
Juan Citizens All. v. BLM, 326 F. Supp. 3d 1227, 1228 (D.N.M. 2018); West. Org. of Res. Councils v. 
BLM, No. CV 16-21-GF-BMM, 2018 WL 1475470, at *9 (D. Mont. Mar. 26, 2018); Montana Envtl. Info. 
Ctr. v. U.S. Office of Surface Mining, Reclamation & Enf’t, No. CV 15-106-M-DWM, 2017 WL 5047901, 
at *3 (D. Mont. Nov. 3, 2017). 
16. See infra Part IV.B.2 and accompanying notes. 
17. See Madeleine Siegel & Alexander Loznak, SURVEY OF GREENHOUSE GAS 
CONSIDERATIONS IN FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
ASSESSMENTS FOR FOSSIL FUEL-RELATED PROJECTS, 2017-2018 3 (2019) (surveying projects with large 
greenhouse gas impacts and finding no instance of a finding that the projects’ impacts were “significant,” 
thus curtailing NEPA analysis, and finding that agencies usually do not analyze cumulative impacts at all).   
18. See Transportation Replaces Power in U.S. as Top Source of CO2 Emissions, 
YALEENVIRONMENT360 (Dec. 4, 2017), https://e360.yale.edu/digest/transportation-replaces-power-in-
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global warming used to be considered a threshold for catastrophe, with this increase 
creating millions of climate refugees fleeing drought and desertification.19 Today, the 
Paris Agreement on climate change sets two degrees of warming as the goal.20 The 
most recent U.N. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report projects 
roughly five degrees of warming by the beginning of the next century in a scenario 
in which business continues as usual.21   
 Although this problem has festered under administrations of both political 
stripes,22 the issue has significantly worsened under the Trump administration.23 
Despite the mounting risks of continuing a “business as usual” approach to fossil 
fuels, the United States under President Trump has pursued an “energy dominance” 
strategy that heavily favors fossil fuels and has eliminated several national climate 
goals.24 The federal agencies that are responsible for project approvals such as coal, 
oil, and natural gas lease sales, interstate natural gas pipelines, and liquid natural gas 
(“LNG”) export terminals, among others, are tasked with analyzing and disclosing 
the climate effects of their projects, which in many cases will increase emissions 
substantially. But as this Article describes, federal agencies under Trump have often 
eschewed providing comprehensive greenhouse gas emission information in their 
 
u-s-as-top-source-of-co2-emissions (describing transportation and power as major sources of greenhouse 
gas emissions in the U.S.). 
19. See Bill McKibben, Global Warming’s Terrifying New Math, ROLLING STONE (July 19, 2012), 
https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/global-warmings-terrifying-new-math-188550/  
(describing Copenhagen Conference’s goal to keep temperature increases below two degrees Celsius to 
avoid catastrophe). 
20. Conference of the Parties, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev/1 (Dec. 12, 2015). 
21. See Robinson Meyer, Are We Living Through Climate Change’s Worst-Case Scenario?, THE 
ATLANTIC (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2019/01/rcp-85-the-climate-
change-disaster-scenario/579700/ (referring to RCP 8.5 scenario, in which temperatures increase by 4.9 
degrees Celsius). But see Zeke Hausfather, Emissions– The ‘Business as Usual’ Story Is Misleading, Nature 
(Jan. 29, 2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-00177-3#ref-CR2 (stating that the “business 
as usual” RCP 8.5 scenario is relatively unlikely).  
22. See Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Dealing with Climate Change Under the National Environmental Policy 
Act, 43 WM. & MARY ENV’T. L. & POL’Y REV. 173, 192 (2018) (discussing how “agencies have largely 
ignored the issue of what role GHG emissions and climate change should play when carrying out their 
mission responsibilities” for much of NEPA’s history). 
23. See id. at 185–92 (discussing the various measures the Trump administration has taken 
weakening federal consideration of GHG emissions). 
24. Memorandum from the White House, President Donald J. Trump Is Unleashing American 
Energy Dominance (May 14, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-
j-trump-unleashing-american-energy-dominance/; Tyler Clevenger, 7 Ways the Trump Administration Is 
Harming the Climate, WORLD RES. INST. (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.wri.org/blog/2020/04/7-ways-
trump-administration-harming-climate (discussing withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on Climate 
Change, the elimination of an efficient lightbulb regulations, and loosening emission standards for cars, 
among other rollbacks). 




project approvals, leaving the public in the dark and masking the agencies’ 
contribution to the climate problem.25     
 Ideally, these agencies would receive corrective guidance from the White 
House Council on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”), a committee established by 
NEPA26 that sets rules determining how agencies perform environmental reviews.27 
But in January 2020, the CEQ instead proposed regulations—the Council’s first since 
the 1980s28—that would significantly decrease the scope and rigor of such analyses,29 
inhibiting agencies from accounting for “geographically remote” impacts like climate 
change, in addition to other changes. These CEQ rules, finalized in July 2020, will 
likely be struck down in the courts;30 nonetheless, they suggest that, at best, the most 
climate guidance agencies can expect from CEQ in the near-term is a feeble shrug.31   
 This Article seeks to fill the void by advising agencies how to better account 
for climate change in NEPA reviews. It does so by highlighting common excuses 
agencies deploy when shortchanging climate change impact analysis and by offering 
solutions to these ostensible obstacles.  
 The challenges cited by agencies with respect to analyzing greenhouse gas 
emissions typically fall into a few consistent categories. First, agencies commonly fail 
to calculate how a given action could encourage additional downstream combustion 
of fossil fuels.32 For example, if the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(“FERC”) approves the construction of an interstate pipeline, that pipeline may 
boost consumption of fossil fuels by power plants and other end users and thus drive 
“downstream emissions.”33 These emissions are part of the climate impacts of a 
 
25. See Marianne Lavelle, Trump Moves to Limit Environmental Reviews, Erase Climate Change from 
NEPA Considerations, INSIDECLIMATENEWS (Jan. 9, 2020), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/090120
20/trump-nepa-environmental-review-changes-climate-change-infrastructure-pipelines (discussing the 
Trump Administration’s efforts to circumscribe NEPA, through regulatory rollback but also through 
several previous guidance documents). 
26. 42 U.S.C. § 4342. 
27. 42 U.S.C. § 4344. 
28. Jean Chemnick, New Trump Rule Would Allow Government to Ignore Climate Impacts of Major 
Projects, SCIENCE (Jan. 9, 2020), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/01/new-trump-rule-would-
allow-government-ignore-climate-impacts-major-projects. 
29. See id. (discussing the rule’s exclusion of indirect environmental impacts of projects); see also 
Alejandro E. Camacho & Robert L. Glicksman, Trump Is Trying to Cripple the Environment and Democracy, 
THE HILL (Jan. 18, 2020), https://thehill.com/opinion/energy-environment/478904-trump-is-trying-to-
cripple-the-environment-and-democracy (discussing the arbitrary page limits of the proposed rule). 
30. For further discussion, see infra Part I.B. 
31. See Chemnick, New Trump Rule, supra note 28. 
32. See Michael Burger & Jessica Wentz, Downstream and Upstream Greenhouse Gas Emissions: The 
Proper Scope of NEPA Review, 41 HARV. ENV’T. L. REV. 109, 133–42 (2017). 
33. See JAYNI HEIN ET AL., INST. FOR POLICY INTEGRITY, PIPELINE APPROVALS AND 
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 4 (2019) (“[P]ipeline infrastructure creates the economic conditions for 
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federal project and should therefore be included in any NEPA review of the project. 
Nonetheless, agencies commonly claim they cannot or should not quantify such 
emissions.34 
At the other end of the supply chain, a project may make gas transportation 
more efficient and enable more gas production, leading to greater “upstream 
emissions.”35 Again, agencies frequently dodge accounting for these emissions, either 
by denying that their projects will have any effect on such emissions or by suggesting 
that any impact will be too speculative to report.36  
A third hurdle in accurately quantifying GHG emissions is modeling 
energy substitution.37 Agencies have irrationally assumed that if a particular fossil 
fuel project is not completed, another project will provide the same type of energy 
from elsewhere at identical cost, resulting in identical GHG emissions.38 Thus, 
agencies routinely assert that the project will not increase emissions without 
evidentiary support. But this “perfect substitution” assumption is contrary to basic 
principles of supply and demand, and federal courts have rejected agency analysis on 
this basis.39 
Finally, even if agencies do attempt to quantify a project’s carbon emissions, 
they often peg the cost of such emissions at the wrong value.40 Agencies chronically 
undervalue the cost to society of pumping more carbon into the atmosphere and 
frequently treat the cost as zero by failing to use available tools like the Interagency 
Working Group’s social cost of greenhouse gases metric.41 The result is a skewed 
analysis that makes the economic benefits of projects look much greater than the 
costs.  
Because of these common shortcomings in their climate analyses, agencies 
face an ever-growing number of lawsuits for their failure to satisfy NEPA obligations 
with respect to greenhouse gas emissions.42 This leaves courts to muddle through 
what level of analysis is feasible and reasonable for the agencies to perform. The 
 
additional natural gas production and consumption, which produce both upstream and downstream 
greenhouse gas emissions, contributing to climate change.”). 
34. See infra Part II. 
35. See HEIN ET AL., supra note 33, at 4.  
36. See infra Part III. 
37. See HEIN ET AL., supra note 33, at 14. 
38. See infra Part IV. 
39. See HEIN ET AL., supra note 33, at 14. 
40. See infra Part V. 
41. KEVIN RENNERT & CORA KINGDON, RES. FOR THE FUTURE, SOCIAL COST OF CARBON 101 
4 (2019), https://www.rff.org/publications/explainers/social-cost-carbon-101/.  
42. Barry Kellman, Comment, NEPA Review of Climate Change, 46 ENV’T. L. REP. NEWS & 
ANALYSIS 10378, 10378 (2016) (referencing the lack of clarity from multiple appellate and district courts 
analyzing NEPA and climate change applicability). 




result is a hodgepodge of rulings across the country pronouncing different 
requirements for different agencies.43 
This Article proposes that the quest to account for the climate effects of 
federal projects need not be so complicated. For every challenge that agencies 
characterize as insurmountable—upstream emissions, downstream emissions, energy 
substitution modeling, or pricing the cost of carbon pollution—tools endorsed by 
experts in law and economics exist.44 In fact, in each case, some agencies are already 
using these tools to calculate carbon emissions, even while other agencies stumble 
over virtually identical challenges. While CEQ provides general guidance to agencies 
on best practices for NEPA analysis, it does not appear to monitor the specific tools 
each agency uses, nor endorse specific tools.45 This paper fills that gap by 
highlighting best practices that all agencies can and should use to arrive at more 
accurate and useful climate analyses. The message to agencies is what adventure 
protagonists hear from their mentors in the third act of their journey: “You’ve had 
the power inside you all along.”   
As a secondary function, this Article can serve as inspiration to state 
agencies that have established their own NEPA counterparts.46 Even if federal 
agencies insist on turning a blind eye to climate change, state agencies may use their 
own statutory authority to evaluate state projects’ climate effects. 
Finally, this Article provides judges guidance for navigating the complex 
world of NEPA analyses. It falls to judges to hold agencies accountable for fulfilling 
their statutory obligation to consider climate impacts meaningfully and communicate 
them clearly. This article can help evaluate agencies’ claims that, “It can’t be done!” 
More often than not, agencies can do the proper analysis, and other agencies have 
done it in the past, rendering many deficiencies arbitrary and capricious.47   
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I explains the statutory function 
and framework of NEPA. The following four parts tackle each of the four common 
challenges to quantifying the cost of GHG emissions. Each section explains the 
particular challenge, offers examples of agency failure to overcome the challenge, 
outlines court trends to date, and finally proposes feasible solutions. Part II pertains 
to downstream emissions, Part III to upstream emissions, Part IV to energy 
substitution, and Part V to the social cost of greenhouse gases.  
 
43. See infra Part IV.C (discussing mixed court guidance on using the social cost of carbon). 
44. See, e.g., HEIN ET AL., supra note 33, at 38 (discussing social cost of carbon endorsements). 
The Article provides other examples throughout. 
45. See Chemnick, New Trump Rule, supra note 28 (describing new CEQ guidance). 
46. See COUNCIL ON ENV’T. QUALITY, States and Local Jurisdictions with NEPA-like Environmental 
Planning Requirements, https://ceq.doe.gov/laws-regulations/states.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2020)(listing 
states with NEPA-like requirements). 
47. When agencies fail to “consider an important aspect of the problem” in deciding a regulation, 
that decision is arbitrary and capricious. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assoc. v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. 
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
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Correctly evaluating GHG emissions in NEPA analyses may seem to be a 
thorny and theoretical issue, but the consequences of such emissions are concrete. In 
2019, the D.C. District Court found that BLM failed to appropriately consider 
climate change effects in leasing almost 400 parcels of land, including the Red 
Desert.48 The ruling provided the groundwork for other lawsuits that suspended the 
extension of oil and gas infrastructure into the basin.49  
 Poor climate analysis has high stakes for agencies, developers, and most of 
all, the public.  By shining a light on what is possible—and required—in terms of 
climate change disclosure, this Article aims to help decisionmakers make better 
decisions that account for actual climate effects, and ideally take steps to lessen their 
contribution to the grave threat of climate change.       
I. THE FRAMEWORK AND FUNCTION OF NEPA 
Signed into law on New Year’s Day in 1970, the National Environmental 
Policy Act (“NEPA”) led the charge in a cavalcade of environmental statutes enacted 
during the rest of the decade.50 Because of NEPA’s pivotal legal importance51 and its 
restraining effect on environmental plundering,52 many have dubbed the statute the 
“Magna Carta of environmental law.”53  This Part traces how the statute functions 
and recent regulations that might change NEPA’s operation. 
A. NEPA’s Broad Reach 
NEPA’s text reflects not only Congress’s broad conception of 
environmental hazards but also lawmakers’ lofty ambitions for the statute. The law’s 
 
48. See WildEarth Guardians v. Zinke, 368 F. Supp. 3d 41, 78 (D.D.C. 2019). Notably, the court 
decided not to vacate the leases. WildEarth Guardians, 368 F. Supp. 3d at 84. 
49. Press Release, Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Lawsuit Spurs Trump Administration to Suspend 
130 Oil, Gas Leases in Utah (Nov. 12, 2019), https://biologicaldiversity.org/w/news/press-
releases/lawsuit-spurs-trump-administration-suspend-130-oil-gas-leases-utah-2019-11-12/.  
50. Richard J. Lazarus, The Greening of American and the Graying of United States Environmental 
Law: Reflections on Environmental Law’s First Three Decades in the United States, 20 VA. ENV’T. L.J. 75, 77 
(2001); National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), NEPA.GOV, https://ceq.doe.gov/ (last visited Nov. 
20, 2019) (calling NEPA “the first major environmental law in the United States”). 
51. Janet McCabe & Cynthia Giles, Trump Proposal to Weaken Project Reviews Threatens the ‘Magna 
Carta of Environmental Law’, THE CONVERSATION (May 15, 2018), http://theconversation.com/trump-
proposal-to-weaken-project-reviews-threatens-the-magna-carta-of-environmental-law-93258 (stating that 
“[NEPA] represents a turning point in thinking about environmental protection”). 
52. Amanda Jahshan, NEPA: The Magna Carta of Environmental Law, NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL 
(Jul. 26, 2013), https://www.nrdc.org/experts/amanda-jahshan/nepa-magna-carta-environmental-law 
(“Much like the Magna Carta protected people from the dangers of monarchical rule, NEPA protects 
people by providing transparency in federal projects.”). 
53. NEPA, NEPA.GOV, supra note 50 (saying NEPA “is often called the ‘Magna Carta’ of Federal 
environmental laws.”). 




stated purposes include “prevent[ing] or eliminat[ing] damage to the environment 
and biosphere and stimulat[ing] the health and welfare of man.”54 NEPA also lists 
more specific statutory goals as line-items, commanding the federal government to 
act as “trustee of the environment for succeeding generations,” to “assure for all 
Americans safe, healthful, productive, and aesthetically and culturally pleasing 
surroundings,” and to “attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment 
without degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended 
consequences.”55  
The primary operational provision of the Act, section 102, requires all 
federal agencies to create a detailed statement about “every recommendation or 
report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly 
affecting the quality of the human environment.”56 This statement must include: 1) 
the proposed action’s environmental impact; 2) unavoidable adverse effects of the 
proposed action; 3) alternatives to the proposed action; 4) the relationship between 
local short-term environmental uses and long-term productivity; and 5) any 
irreversible resource commitment the proposed action entails.57 Over the years, this 
detailed report has come to be known as an “environmental impact statement” 
(“EIS”).58 
Because NEPA states that only “major Federal actions significantly 
affecting” the environment require environmental impact statements, agencies must 
make the threshold determination of whether a particular action triggers this NEPA 
obligation.59 If the agency is unsure as to whether an EIS is required, it must 
complete an “environmental assessment” (“EA”).60 Shorter and less resource-
intensive than an EIS, an EA examines the “context” and “intensity” of a proposed 
action.61 If the agency determines the action will not significantly affect the 
environment, the agency then issues a “Finding of No Significant Impact” 
 
54. 42 U.S.C. § 4321. 
55. And these demands constitute only half of the list of goals! See 42 U.S.C. § 4331. 
56. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C). 
57. Id. 
58. See, e.g., City of New York v. I.C.C., 4 F.3d 181, 182 (2d Cir. 1993) (referring to activities 
that “require a full environmental impact statement (“EIS”)”); 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4 (referring to 
“environmental impact statement”); National Environmental Policy Act Review Process, ENV’T. PROT. 
AGENCY (last updated Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.epa.gov/nepa/national-environmental-policy-act-
review-process  (summarizing the “EIS” process). 
59. Wildearth Guardians v. Zinke, 368 F. Supp. 3d 41, 53 (D.D.C. 2019); 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4. 
60. See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4 (explaining that an agency must make its decision to regulate based on 
an environmental assessment if the proposed action does not categorically require or avoid environmental 
impact statements). 
61. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27.  
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(“FONSI”).62 Thus no EIS need be prepared.63 Otherwise, the EA triggers an EIS. 
A typical EIS involves considerable resources. EISs can take several years to 
produce,64 and a 2014 study placed average cost per EIS at $2.9 million.65 Given 
these numbers, it is perhaps unsurprising that agency EAs tend to result in findings 
of no significant impact much more frequently than they trigger EISs. Less than 1% 
of NEPA decisions involve an EIS.66 
When conducting an EIS, regulations require agencies to consider three 
types of consequences that might result from the proposed action: 1) direct effects; 
2) indirect effects; and 3) cumulative effects.67 Agencies must also consider these 
environmental impacts in EAs, although regulations allow “brief discussions” of the 
impacts, rather than the extended descriptions typical of EISs.68 Direct effects are 
“caused by the action and occur at the same time and place.”69 Indirect effects are 
also caused by the action but “are later in time or farther removed in distance, [yet] 
are still reasonably foreseeable.”70 Regulations outline what might constitute indirect 
effects, including “growth inducing effects and other effects related to induced 
changes in the pattern of land use, population density or growth rate, and related 
effects on air and water and other natural systems.”71 Finally, cumulative effects are 
those that result “from the incremental impact of the action when added to other 
past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions regardless of what agency 
(Federal or non-Federal) or person” takes the actions.72 
Agencies must also set the proper scope for their EIS analyses. The 
regulations provide that in evaluating the impact of a proposed action, agencies must 
consider “connected actions,” “cumulative actions,” and “similar actions.”73 Actions 
are connected if they automatically trigger other actions that may require EIS 
analyses; if they “cannot or will not proceed unless other actions are taken previously 
or simultaneously;” or if they “are independent parts of a larger action and depend 
 
62. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.13. 
63. Id. 
64. NAT’L ASS’N ENVTL. PROF’LS, ANNUAL NEPA REPORT 2015 13 (Karen Johnson ed., 2016) 
(“The 183 final EISs in our sample had an average preparation time . . . of 1841 ± 1347 days (5.0 ± 3.7 
years)”). 
65. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-14-369, NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
ACT: LITTLE INFORMATION EXISTS ON NEPA ANALYSES 12 (2014). 
66. Id. at 7. 
67. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25.  
68. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(b). 
69. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7. 
73. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25. 




on the larger action for their justification.”74 Cumulative actions are those which have 
cumulatively significant impacts when considered with other proposed actions.75 And 
similar actions are those that share features, such as timing or geography, with other 
reasonably foreseeable or proposed agency actions, such that their environmental 
consequences ought to be evaluated together.76 
The requirement to consider certain actions together may overlap with the 
requirement to consider a project’s myriad effects.77 For example, a proposed coal 
mining plan will produce greenhouse gas emissions from mining, transporting, and 
burning coal.78 The environmental effects of coal transport should be discussed as 
effects of a “connected action” if the transport requires a separate federal approval, 
but they should also be discussed as indirect effects of the proposed coal mining 
plan.79 This overlap of effect and action considerations enables NEPA to weave an 
expansive net that more comprehensively captures the environmental impacts of 
agency actions. 
The suite of regulations governing federal agency NEPA obligations is 
promulgated by the White House Council on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”).80 
Established in section 202 of NEPA, CEQ sits in the Executive Office of the 
President.81 NEPA directs that members must have the training and experience “to 
analyze and interpret environmental trends and information of all kinds.”82 The 
Council has sundry responsibilities with respect to advising the President on 
environmental issues, but one of its chief obligations is to regulate and review agency 
NEPA decisions.83  
The Council does not approve or disapprove specific agency NEPA 
decisions;84 nonetheless, if an agency departs from CEQ-approved procedures, the 





77. Burger & Wentz, supra note 32, at 129. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. Heartwood, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 230 F.3d 947, 949 (7th Cir. 2000) (“The Council on 
Environmental Quality (“CEQ”) administers NEPA and promulgates regulations related to NEPA that 
are binding on federal agencies.”). 
81. 42 U.S.C. § 4342. 
82. Id. 
83. See id. (tasking CEQ with “apprais[ing] programs and activities of the Federal Government in 
the light of the policy set forth in title I of this Act”). 
84. See id. (making no reference to the power to review agency decisions); see also CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RL33152 THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: BACKGROUND AND 
IMPLEMENTATION 1 (2011) (“CEQ was not authorized to enforce those regulations.”). 
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binding on agencies,85 and the Supreme Court, as discussed in more detail below, has 
described CEQ’s regulations as “entitled to substantial deference” in determining 
what is required by NEPA.86 Thus, the regulations promulgated by CEQ have 
considerable sway over agency behavior. CEQ also drafts guidance that helps 
agencies understand their NEPA obligations and carry out best practices.87 Courts 
have interpreted CEQ’s guidance as advisory, rather than binding.88  
 The Supreme Court has announced an arbitrary and capricious standard to 
review an agency’s decision not to prepare an EIS.89 And courts may force agencies 
to redo or supplement their analyses based on a similar arbitrary and capricious 
standard of review.90 In the words of the Ninth Circuit, NEPA’s goals “can be 
achieved only if the prescribed procedures are faithfully followed; grudging, pro 
forma compliance will not do.”91 Accordingly, courts review NEPA analyses to 
ensure that agencies have taken a “hard look” at environmental impacts before 
reaching a decision.92  
 
85. E.g., Mid State Coal. for Progress v. Surface Transp. Bd., 345 F.3d 520, 549 (8th Cir. 2003) 
(describing CEQ regulations as “binding on the agenc[y]”); Nat. Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Dept. of 
Interior, 397 F. Supp. 3d 430, 453-54 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (describing CEQ as “promulgating rules applicable 
to and binding on all Federal agencies”). But see Taxpayers of Michigan Against Casinos (TOMAC) v. 
Norton, 433 F.3d 852, 861 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (noting that “the binding effect of CEQ regulations is far 
from clear”). 
86. Marsh v. Oregon Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 372 (1989); Robertson v. Methow Valley 
Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 355–56 (1989); Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979). In some 
cases, a court may refer to CEQ guidelines both as “binding” and as “entitled to substantial deference.” 
E.g., Nat. Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 397 F. Supp. 3d 430,453–54 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). But 
see TOMAC, 433 F.3d at 861; City of Alexandria v. Slater, 198 F.3d 862, 866 n.3 (D.D.C. 1999) (saying 
CEQ is only empowered to issue binding regulations under executive order, not NEPA itself).  
87. See Front Page, NEPA.GOV, https://ceq.doe.gov/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2020) (“CEQ oversees 
NEPA implementation, principally through issuing guidance and interpreting regulations that implement 
NEPA's procedural requirements.”). 
88. See e.g., Andrus, 442 U.S. at 356–7 (contrasting the binding nature of CEQ’s regulations before 
and after President Carter’s executive order changed the regulations from guidance to binding rules); 
WildEarth Guardians v. Zinke, 368 F. Supp. 3d 41, 70 n.27 (D.D.C. 2019) (calling CEQ’s guidance “not 
binding”); San Juan Citizens All. v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 326 F. Supp. 3d 1227, 1243 n.5 (D.N.M. 
2018) (noting that CEQ guidance is nonbinding); see also CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 84, at 10 
(referring to CEQ’s “informal” guidance as distinct from its regulations). 
89. Marsh, 490 U.S. at 377 n.23. 
90. See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976) (citing Nat. Res. Def. Council v. 
Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1972)) (describing how courts must ensure that agencies take a 
“hard look” at the environmental effects of a proposed action); Lathan v. Brinegar, 506 F.2d 677, 693 (9th 
Cir. 1974) (discussing the need to review procedure for serious flaws that prevent agencies from meeting 
NEPA’s goals); Jason J. Czarnezki, Revisiting the Tense Relationship Between the U.S. Supreme Court, 
Administrative Procedure, and the National Environmental Policy Act, 25 STAN. ENV’T. L.J. 3, 13 (2006) 
(referring to APA as governing NEPA review).  
91. Lathan, 506 F.2d at 693. 
92. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizen Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989).  




Agencies must scrutinize not only the environmental effects of the 
proposed action but also the environmental effects of “all reasonable alternatives . . . 
so that reviewers may evaluate their comparative merits.”93 One of the alternatives 
must be a “no action” alternative.94 The regulations identify the alternatives analysis 
process as “the heart of the environmental impact statement,”95 and the Second 
Circuit has described this requirement as “the linchpin of the entire impact 
statement.”96  
Multiple cases have affirmed that climate change considerations are within 
NEPA’s ambit.97 Agencies that fail to disclose and consider the significant 
greenhouse gas effects of their proposed projects and alternatives risk the chance that 
judges will find their analyses inadequate.98  
B. Actions from CEQ on Climate Change 
As climate change has become a more pressing issue, CEQ has released 
guidance on the subject. The contours and limits of this guidance are discussed below. 
Despite the muscular text of NEPA, courts have interpreted the statute as 
one of procedural rather than substantive force. The Supreme Court first declared 
NEPA a procedure-forcing law in 1978, in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation 
v. Natural Resources Defense Council.99 The Court asserted that, “NEPA does set forth 
significant substantive goals for the Nation, but its mandate to the agencies is 
essentially procedural.”100 The Court noted that NEPA’s function was “to insure a 
fully informed and well-considered decision,” not to reach the same conclusion that 
the Court would have reached given the information at hand.101  
Because of the clear and growing importance of climate change, in 2016, 
CEQ released guidance to instruct agencies on how to account for climate change 
 
93. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. Monroe Cty. Conservation Council v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693, 697–98 (2d Cir. 1972). 
97. See infra Part II.C. 
98. E.g., Ctr. For Biological Diversity v. NHTSA, 508 F.3d 508, 550 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding 
greenhouse gas emissions were cumulative impacts that should have been considered by agency in setting 
CAFE standards); WildEarth Guardians v. Zinke, 368 F. Supp. 3d 41, 67–68 (D.D.C. 2019) (requiring 
accounting for greenhouse gases); Border Power Plant Working Grp. v. DOE, 260 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1028 
(S.D. Cal. 2003) (finding EA was inadequate because agency failed to consider the effects of carbon 
dioxide emissions).  
99. 435 U.S. 519, 548–49 (1978). 
100. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 558. 
101. Id. The Court affirmed this position in Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 
U.S. 223, 227 (1980). 
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consistently in the NEPA process.102 The guidance explained that agencies should 
consider a) the potential effects of a proposed action on climate change and b) the 
potential effects of climate change on the proposed action.103 Agencies should 
quantify direct and indirect GHG emissions, and where such quantification proved 
impossible, agencies should include a qualitative analysis of these effects.104 EIS 
analyses should allow agencies to consider “the short- and long-term effects and 
benefits in the alternatives and mitigation analysis.”105 Although NEPA does not 
expressly require monetizing costs and benefits of projects, the CEQ guidance said 
that in cases in which agencies choose to perform economic analyses, valuations must 
take “into account best practices for cost-benefit analysis with strong theoretical 
underpinnings.”106 CEQ highlighted the social cost of carbon as “a harmonized, 
interagency metric that can give decision makers and the public useful 
information.”107 In sum, CEQ set a high but achievable bar for agencies that 
recognized the danger of climate change, its relevance to NEPA analyses, and the 
ways these analyses should incorporate climate considerations. 
In 2017, shortly after President Trump’s election, CEQ withdrew its 2016 
guidelines.108 In June 2019, CEQ published a draft of weaker replacement 
guidance.109 The new guidance allows a qualitative analysis of GHG emissions when 
“an agency determines that the tools, methods, or data inputs necessary to quantify 
a proposed action’s GHG emissions are not reasonably available, or [quantification] 
otherwise would not be practicable.”110 Agencies may also opt out of quantification 
when “information necessary for quantification is unavailable, not of high quality, or 
the complexity of identifying emissions would make quantification overly 
speculative.”111  
This noncommittal language opens the door to avoiding consideration of 
greenhouse gases if the effects are uncertain or speculative, and represents a 
departure from CEQ’s longstanding presumption in favor of gathering information, 
barring extraordinary circumstances in which obtaining information is exorbitantly 
 
102. Memorandum from Council on Envtl. Quality, Final Guidance for Federal Departments and 
Agencies on Consideration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and the Effects of Climate Change in National 
Environmental Policy Act Reviews 2 (2016). 
103. Id. at 4. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 5. 
106. Id. at 33 n.86. 
107. Id. 
108. Draft National Environmental Policy Act Guidance on Consideration of Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions, 84 Fed. Reg. 30,097, 30,097 (June 26, 2019). 
109. See id. at 30,098. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. 




costly or no known means of collecting the information exists.112 Moreover, CEQ 
claims that the social cost of carbon was “not intended for socio-economic analysis 
under NEPA or decision-making on individual actions, including project-level 
decisions,” thus discouraging its use.113  
The Trump administration has also segmented projects to downplay 
climate impacts in NEPA analyses.113 Agencies routinely understate the climate 
impacts of projects by dividing proposed actions into more diminutive components, 
rather than considering all actions collectively.114 Defining a project narrowly offers 
a way to evade consideration of broader environmental impacts.   
 CEQ proposed new regulations in January 2020.115 The new regulations 
contain sweeping changes, some of which seem designed, at least in part, to limit 
climate change considerations.  
 First, the regulations eliminate the requirement to consider direct, indirect, 
and cumulative effects.116 Instead, CEQ claims, “effects should not be considered 
significant if they are remote in time, geographically remote, or the result of a lengthy 
causal chain.”117 This restriction could bar consideration of the global and future 
effects of climate change.118 
 Second, CEQ proposes that instead of considering “all reasonable 
alternatives,” agencies should consider only alternatives “which must meet the goals 
of the applicant, where applicable.”119 Agencies could easily narrowly define project 
goals—the goal to extract coal from a particular site, for example—and thus ignore 
environmentally beneficial alternatives. 
 Third, CEQ suggests that other analyses, like regulatory impact analyses 
(“RIAs”), can substitute for NEPA assessments.120 So-called RIAs have a cost-based 
focus, not a science-centered one; agencies produce RIAs under the authority of an 
executive order that focuses on the need to assess not only environmental costs but 
also the cost to private industry, recognizing that “the private sector and private 
 
112. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 for current language. Courts continue to implement a hard look 
standard and do not merely accept an agency’s determination that quantitative data is overly speculative 
See, e.g., Citizens for a Healthy Cmty. v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 377 F. Supp. 3d 1223, 1237 (D. 
Colo. 2019). 
113. 84 Fed. Reg. at 30,099. 
114. Id. 
115. Update to the Regulations Implementing the Procedural Provisions of the National 
Environmental Policy Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 1684 (Jan. 10, 2020). 
116. Id. at 1707–08. 
117. Id. at 1708. 
118. See supra Part I.A.  
119. 85 Fed. Reg. at 1701. 
120. Id. at 1705. 
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markets are the best engine for economic growth.”121 Although RIAs could 
theoretically include comprehensive quantification and monetization of climate 
change effects, agencies could skirt in-depth conversations about environmental 
effects by using RIAs that emphasize savings to the regulated industry.  
 Finally, having eviscerated NEPA analysis, CEQ has attempted to prevent 
agencies from reviving more demanding procedures. The proposal includes a 
“provision [that] will prevent agencies from designing additional procedures that will 
result in increased costs or delays,” and requires that agencies “shall not impose 
additional procedures or requirements” for NEPA analyses.122 Thus, even agencies 
industrious and resourceful enough to investigate climate change effects may be 
blocked from doing so. 
 The proposal, now finalized,123 is virtually certain to generate challenges in 
court, where the changes will likely be struck down as inconsistent with NEPA. 
Excluding temporally or geographically removed environmental effects is difficult to 
square with NEPA’s statutory imperative to produce a detailed statement on the 
“environmental impact of [a] proposed action,” “any adverse environmental effects,” 
and “the relationship between local short-term uses of man’s environment and the 
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity.”124 The stated purpose of 
NEPA makes clear that the statute is concerned with fulfilling commitments not only 
to “all Americans,” but also to “succeeding generations,”125 a focus that makes it 
difficult to narrowly construe the statutory requirement to consider “alternatives to 
the proposed action”126 as only those that serve a particular agency’s whim. And 
Congress’s expending the better part of a provision explaining what must be included 
 
121. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 190 (Jan. 4, 1993); See also OFFICE OF INFO. & 
REGULATORY AFFAIRS, AGENCY CHECKLIST: REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS 1, https://www.white
house.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/inforeg/inforeg/regpol/RIA_Checklist.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 
2020) (attributing regulatory impact statements to Executive Order 12,866). 
122. 85 Fed. Reg. at 1693. 
123. Update to the Regulations Implementing the Procedural Provisions of the National 
Environmental Policy Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 43,304 (July 16, 2020). Although the language has changed 
slightly, the proposed changes have by and large made their way into the final rule. For remote effects 
and significance, see id. at 43,375 (“Effects should generally not be considered significant if they are remote 
in time, geographically remote, or the product of a lengthy causal chain.”) (emphasis added to highlight 
new qualifier that was not in proposal). To see confining reasonable alternatives to those which “meet the 
goals of the applicant,” see id. at 43,376. To see the finalized changes with respect to substituting other 
analyses for NEPA analyses, see id. at 43,373, although the agency’s discussion no longer specifically 
references RIAs as possible substitutes. CEQ also finalizes the bar on agency ability to develop additional 
NEPA procedures at page 43,373.   
124. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C). 
125. Id. § 4331(b)(1). 
126. Id. § 4332(C). 




in a “detailed statement” casts doubt on the legality of substituting other reports—
like RIAs—for NEPA analyses.127 
Thus, agencies would be wise to prepare for a world in which climate change 
plays a central role in NEPA analyses. Unfortunately, because of CEQ’s regressive 
posture, agencies are less likely to consider the climate impacts of their actions 
adequately, more likely to reach suboptimal decisions, and more likely to find 
themselves in protracted NEPA litigation. 
This Part explained the goals and function of NEPA. The next four parts 
explain how to fulfill the statute’s promise by describing current approaches and 
highlighting best practices to adequately account for climate change.  
II. ACCOUNTING FOR DOWNSTREAM EMISSIONS 
 Downstream emissions provide a useful starting point for considering 
common shortcomings in NEPA climate analysis. These emissions have been the 
subject of considerable litigation, and after years of agency resistance, courts have 
coalesced around a position that such emissions must be considered in NEPA 
analyses. Agencies should take two lessons about downstream emissions: 1) Despite 
claims of infeasibility, agencies in fact possess the tools needed to calculate these 
emissions; and 2) Inadequate consideration of greenhouse gases may ultimately lead 
to slower progress on projects because of successful court challenges. 
 This Part begins by defining downstream emissions and explaining why 
NEPA regulations suggest such emissions must be accounted for in multiple 
contexts. The article then discusses the traditional regulatory approach to 
downstream emissions and judicial reactions. Finally, the Part ends by suggesting 
how agencies should analyze downstream emissions in NEPA analyses. 
A. What Are Downstream Emissions? 
 Downstream emissions, as the name suggests, are those emissions that occur 
later in the supply chain than the project under NEPA consideration.128 In the fossil 
fuel context, downstream emissions are typically those emitted after fuel 
transportation and include emissions caused by power plant operations and by the 
combustion of fuel.129  
 As discussed in Part I, NEPA’s text requires accounting for “the 
environmental impact” of a project, as well as “any adverse environmental effects 
 
127. Id. 
128. “Downstream emissions” and “upstream emissions” are not terms coined for this article but 
are part of the parlance around emissions from projects. See generally Burger & Wentz, supra note 32. 
129. See e.g., Sierra Club v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 867 F.3d 1357, 1363 (D.C. Cir. 2017) 
(describing the “downstream end of Sabal Trail” linking to a power plant); see also BHP CO., SCOPE 3 
EMISSIONS CALCULATION METHODOLOGY 2018 3 (2018) (defining downstream emissions as those 
related to “sold goods or devices”). 
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which cannot be avoided” if the project goes forward.130 CEQ regulations have 
implemented this mandate by requiring agencies to consider both direct and indirect 
effects from projects.131 Indirect emissions—those caused by a project but removed 
in time or place132—can be further divided into downstream and upstream effects.  
 Whether environmental impacts are direct, indirect downstream, or 
indirect upstream effects depends on the effects’ relation to the project under 
consideration. Consider emissions involved in fuel transportation—through a 
pipeline gas leak, for example. These emissions would qualify as direct emissions if 
the project under consideration were construction of the pipeline itself. But these 
emissions would be “downstream emissions” if the project considered were a gas 
extraction project supplying gas to the pipeline. Finally, these emissions would 
constitute “upstream emissions” if the analyzed project were a power plant supplied 
by the pipeline.  
 Several CEQ regulations suggest that downstream emissions are relevant 
to NEPA analyses in a number of different contexts. Depending on the specifics of 
a given project, an agency should consider downstream emissions as “indirect effects” 
or direct effects of “connected actions.”133  
 Downstream emissions qualify as indirect effects because they are “removed 
in distance” from the project that causes them but nonetheless “are still reasonably 
foreseeable,” meeting CEQ’s definition of “indirect effects.”134 For example, coal is 
burned at a different location from the coal mine where it is extracted or the railroad 
on which it is transported. But virtually all coal extracted is ultimately burned.135 
Thus, the greenhouse gases emitted from combusting coal are removed in time and 
place from extraction or transport projects but are foreseeable effects of both. 
Accordingly, agencies could describe downstream emissions as indirect effects in 
NEPA analyses.  
 In some cases, it may also be appropriate to describe downstream emissions 
as the direct effects of connected actions.136 As discussed in Part I, actions are 
 
130. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C). 
131. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8. 
132. Id. § 1508.8(b).  
133. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25. See also Burger & Wentz, supra note 32, at 168, 173 (describing means of 
accounting for upstream emissions). 
134. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(b). These definitions come from the longstanding regulations the Trump 
administration has proposed to replace. Under the proposed regulations, indirect effects need not be 
considered and cannot be considered significant. 85 Fed. Reg. 1684, 1729 (Jan. 10, 2020) (“Effects should 
not be considered significant if they are remote in time, geographically remote, or the result of a lengthy 
causal chain.”). We focus on the preexisting regulations, because the proposed regulations are unlikely to 
survive legal challenge. 
135. See Coal Explained, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (last updated May 9, 2019), 
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/coal/use-of-coal.php (discussing the primary uses of coal, and that 
burning is involved in those uses). 
136. Burger & Wentz, supra note 32, at 169. 




connected if one action automatically triggers the other, if one action cannot proceed 
unless the other occurs first, or if the actions are independent parts of a larger 
action.137 In some cases, these descriptions may apply to various phases of the fossil 
fuel industry, particularly those situations in which agencies are evaluating permits 
for different parts of the fossil fuel chain at the same time.138 If one agency is 
determining whether to lease land for natural gas extraction, for example, and no 
pipelines run to the area under consideration, then approving the lease may trigger 
the construction of a pipeline, because eventually the fuel produced must be 
transported. Similarly, building the pipeline only makes sense if the land is leased 
for natural gas extraction. This interdependence connects the two actions to each 
other. A NEPA analysis, therefore, should not look at either project in isolation but 
should consider the two projects’ environmental effects together.  
 Regulatory requirements to consider multiple effects and actions in NEPA 
analyses make clear that agencies have a responsibility to account for downstream 
emissions. Perhaps for this reason, agencies do not use legal arguments, but feasibility 
claims, to evade disclosing these effects. The next section discusses agencies’ 
inconsistent and unsatisfactory approach to downstream emissions. 
B. Regulatory Approach to Downstream Emissions 
Agencies are inconsistent when accounting for downstream emissions. 
Surveys of environmental impact statements over the past decade have revealed 
uneven treatment of downstream emissions from one agency to the next.139 For 
example, one survey of EISs produced between 2009 and 2011 found that the Bureau 
of Land Management (“BLM”) seldom calculated downstream emissions from 
combustion associated with mining projects,140 while the Forest Service seldom 
quantified emissions at all,141 and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers conducted full 
life-cycle analyses of projects’ indirect emissions.142  
 
137. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(1). 
138. Burger & Wentz, supra note 32, at 171. 
139. See generally AIMEE DELACH ET AL., DEFS. OF WILDLIFE, REASONABLY FORESEEABLE 
FUTURES: CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION AND THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 
(2013); JESSICA WENTZ ET AL., SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE LAW, SURVEY OF CLIMATE 
CHANGE CONSIDERATIONS IN FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS, 2012–2014 (2016); 
PATRICK WOOLSEY, SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE LAW, CONSIDERATION OF CLIMATE 
CHANGE IN FEDERAL EISS, 2009–2011 (2012).  
140. WOOLSEY, supra note 138, at 9. 
141. Id. at 10. 
142. Id. at 13. This difference in agency analysis is probably not due to a lack of resources of one 
agency relative to another. For example, the Forest Service issued guidance about how to account for 
climate change in NEPA analysis in 2009 and referenced efforts to update its model, but then said that it 
was “not necessary to calculate GHG emissions for most projects.” FOREST SERV., CLIMATE CHANGE 
CONSIDERATIONS IN PROJECT LEVEL NEPA ANALYSIS 5 (2009), https://www.fs.fed.us/emc/nepa/clim
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 Even within the same agency—indeed, within the same field office—
treatment of climate change effects may vary from one impact statement to the next. 
Consider the BLM Tres Rios Field Office in Colorado. In a 2018 EA evaluating the 
environmental impacts associated with approving a permit to drill a natural gas well, 
the Office quantified anticipated upstream and downstream GHG emissions.143 
Despite this quantification, the EA did not attempt to translate these emissions into 
climate effects, explaining that “[n]o analysis tools exist to describe the project’s 
incremental contributions to the global phenomenon of climate change.”144 By 
contrast, the same field office produced a 2019 EA approving a coal mine expansion 
that not only quantified downstream GHG emissions145 but referred to a Technical 
Resources Report, which contains an extended qualitative discussion of climate 
change effects nationally and on Colorado in particular.146     
 Notwithstanding this unexplained variation in methodology among NEPA 
analyses, an examination of NEPA reports reveals some common fallacies. This 
section discusses each in turn.  
1. Uncertainty and the Fallacy of Future Self-Restraint 
 Agencies commonly cite uncertainty to avoid accounting for downstream 
emissions. Lamenting the number of variables that pop up in the supply chain 
between production and combustion, an agency may claim it cannot meaningfully 
estimate a project’s downstream emissions.147  
 One variety of the uncertainty excuse is the claim that agencies cannot be 
sure how much of the fossil fuel associated with a given project will ultimately be 
combusted. The argument runs as follows: Permit applicants might not mine or drill 
leases to full capacity, and those minerals that are extracted might not be burned.148 
We dub this excuse the “future self-restraint” fallacy. Essentially, agencies claim that 
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as its justification for this position.  
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PLAN MODIFICATION, at 3-10 to 3-11 (2019). 
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12–16, 46–47 (2019). 
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Statement 4–6 (2017). 
148. See, e.g., Citizens for a Healthy Cmty. v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 377 F. Supp. 3d 1223, 
1237 (D. Colo. 2019); Wilderness Workshop v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 342 F. Supp. 3d 1145, 1155–56 
(D. Colo. 2018); High Country Advocates v. U.S. Forest Serv., 52 F. Supp. 3d 1174, 1196–97 (D. Colo. 
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permit applicants, for some unspecified reason, might exercise self-restraint in the 
future and leave some mineral resources in the ground. But this assumption is 
difficult to justify because permittees are likely to fully extract mineral resources for 
the same reason restaurant patrons are likely to finish an ice cream sundae: they paid 
for it, and it’s theirs for the taking. Absent a concrete reason to expect that a lease 
will not be used to its full potential, it is irrational to assume permittees will leave 
money on the table by leaving minerals in the ground.149  
 Strikingly, in other contexts, agencies treat full fossil fuel yield as an 
axiomatic truth. While invoking the future self-restraint fallacy to avoid calculating 
GHG emissions, agencies frequently assume 100 percent fossil fuel yield when 
calculating a project’s anticipated profits.150 This “all upside” fallacy—relying on 
assumptions about a project’s benefits while rejecting the same assumptions as too 
uncertain in the context of a project’s costs—crops up in multiple contexts and is 
discussed further in Part IV.  
 The Red Desert, discussed in the Introduction, provides an example of the 
“future self-restraint” fallacy at work. In 2015 and 2016, BLM issued 282 oil and gas 
leases covering 303,000 acres of federal land in Wyoming.151 As part of this process, 
the Bureau created several EAs discussing the environmental impacts of leasing.152 
The EAs admitted that opening the lands to oil and gas drilling would have 
downstream climate impacts through the burning of the extracted fossil fuels, but 
skirted quantifying those impacts or finding them significant.153 For example, one 
EA acknowledged that each of the parcel’s wells contained roughly 0.00059 metric 
tons of carbon dioxide but then cited uncertainty about the extent to which these 
wells would ultimately be drilled as reason that it was “not possible to predict at this 
stage what level of emissions would occur.”154 In other words, the agencies argued, 
the permittees might exercise future self-restraint and not fully drill their wells. 
 This lack of quantification affected other parts of the EA. For instance, the 
agency could equivocate about the difference between the Bureau’s proposal to lease 
all of the parcels immediately and the alternative of deferring leasing some of the 
 
149. To bolster this intuitive position, consider that fossil fuel companies’ stock prices are driven 
by the companies’ proven mineral reserves. Peter R. Orszag, Markets Are Putting a Price on Carbon Risks, 
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 4, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-12-04/carbon-risks-
reflected-in-stock-prices. If companies utilized only a fraction of their reserves, this would almost certainly 
lower their stock prices. 
150. See id.  
151. WildEarth Guardians v. Zinke, 368 F. Supp. 3d 41, 55 (D.D.C. 2019). 
152. WildEarth Guardians, 368 F. Supp. 3d at 55–56. 
153. See id. (summarizing the EAs’ treatment of climate change and noting that a FONSI was 
issued at each stage). 
154. BLM, AUGUST 2015 LEASE PARCELS: WIND RIVER / BIGHORN BASIN DISTRICT, DOI-
BLM-WY-R000-2015-0001-EA 4–31 (2015) [hereinafter WIND RIVER EA]. 
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parcels.155 Because “the level of development [was] unknown” under either scenario, 
the difference in greenhouse gas emissions could not be quantified, the agency 
argued.156 The Bureau dispensed with the entire comparative discussion in two 
sentences.157  
 Ostensible uncertainty about the extent of drilling also allowed the agency 
to shrug off its duty to perform a cumulative impact analysis. Nodding to the 
thousands of active, producible, or serviceable wells around the proposed leasing 
region, the Bureau claimed an inability to determine the net impact of these 
multitudinous sites.158 Because the assessment of greenhouse gases was “in its 
formative phase,” the Bureau explained, it was impossible to know the project’s 
“incremental effects on climate change globally or in the area of these site-specific 
actions.”159  
 Throughout the EA’s abbreviated discussions of climate change, the Bureau 
repeatedly emphasized uncertainty, but it always seemed to interpret that uncertainty 
as an invitation to press forward with its lease sales rather than to proceed with 
caution.160 In fact, at one point, the agency catalogued the many sources of 
uncertainty in its considerations, including price swings, resource limitations, 
regulatory changes, and the volume of gases vented from processing facilities.161 But 
never did the agency consider this uncertainty as sufficient reason to either engage 
in a more detailed EIS or to restrain leasing. Instead, the agency found no significant 
environmental impact in each EA and decided to move forward with the lease sales.162 
2. The “Our Hands Are Tied” Fallacy 
 A second tack an agency may use to evade accounting for greenhouse gases 
is the claim that other authorities play a role in the permitting process, and thus the 
lead NEPA agency lacks authority over the decision resulting in GHG emissions. 
For example, an agency in charge of approving whether land is leased for coal mines 
might argue that it has no authority over the way in which that coal is extracted, 
transported, and combusted. Thus, the argument runs: the agency approving the 
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Worland Field Offices). 
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161. Id. at 4–48. 
162. See WildEarth Guardians, v. Zinke, 368 F. Supp. 3d 41, 55 (D.D.C. 2019) (stating that each 
EA resulted in a FONSI). 




lease need not consider downstream emissions over which it has no jurisdictional 
control. This claim springs from Supreme Court precedent that agencies need not 
consider environmental effects in NEPA analyses if the agencies have no power to 
prevent those emissions.163 The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has 
brandished the excuse for years in what amounts to an argument that the agency’s 
“hands are tied.”164 But agencies often do have authority over the decision.165 Courts’ 
skepticism of this excuse is discussed in the following section on case law. 
3. The “Frivolous Fraction” Fallacy 
 Finally, even if an agency does account for downstream greenhouse gas 
emissions, the agency may dodge finding a project’s impacts to be “significant,” often 
by comparing the project’s emissions to national or global GHG emissions. The 
result, inevitably, is that each project’s emissions are dwarfed by comparison to a vast 
denominator; the very fact that climate change poses such a huge threat allows 
agencies to move forward with projects worsening climate change. This Article refers 
to this argument as the “frivolous fraction” fallacy. 
 BLM’s Wyoming leases again provide a useful illustration. In addition to 
avoiding quantification of downstream emissions, the Bureau further trivialized the 
greenhouse gas implications of the lease sales by comparing the project’s downstream 
emissions with national or global emissions.166 Because global greenhouse gas 
emissions pose such an enormous problem, the Bureau suggested, “the amount 
released as a result of potential production from the proposed lease tracts would not 
have a measurable effect.”167  
 The traditional neglect of downstream emissions, however, may be 
changing. Seven of the nine EISs for fossil fuel related projects completed between 
2017 and 2018 quantified downstream greenhouse gas emissions.168 But over the same 
period, most agencies failed to examine cumulative effects of other ongoing projects 
in NEPA analyses.169 And all of those EAs resulted in findings that no significant 
 
163. Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 770 (2004). 
164. See, e.g., WildEarth Guardians v. Office of Surface Mining, Reclamation & Enf’t, 104 F. Supp. 
3d 1208, 1230 (D. Colo. 2015); Dine Citizens Against Ruining Our Env’t v. Office of Surface Mining, 
Reclamation & Enf’t, 82 F. Supp. 3d 1201, 1217 (D. Colo. 2015). The D.C. Circuit dispensed with this 
excuse in Sierra Club v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n. 867 F.3d 1357, 1374 (D.C. Cir. 2017). But see Tenn. 
Gas Pipeline Co., 169 FERC  ¶ 61,230, 62,841 (2019) (McNamee, Comm’r, concurring) (rejecting the 
D.C. Circuit’s reasoning in a FERC Concurrence). 
165. See infra Part II.C.  
166. WIND RIVER EA, supra note 153, at 4-31. 
167. Id. 
168. SIEGEL & LOZNAK, supra note 17, at 17. 
169. Id. at 10. 
Fall 2020 Implementing NEPA in the Era of Climate Change  25
impacts to the environment would occur, thus avoiding full EISs.170 Despite the 
independent findings of insignificance, these EA projects, if considered together, 
would pump between 654 to 683 million metric tons of carbon dioxide into the 
atmosphere, equivalent to the annual emissions of at least 139 million cars.171 
 Improvements in accounting for downstream emissions likely spring from 
court decisions, which have increasingly demanded that agencies account for 
downstream emissions in NEPA analyses. The next section will examine the state of 
case law on the subject. 
 
C. Case Precedent  
 Courts have repeatedly found that downstream emissions are foreseeable 
indirect effects of leases for fossil fuel production and approval of pipelines or 
railroads. Thus, these indirect effects must be accounted for and quantified where 
possible.172  
 Courts have chipped away at agencies’ uncertainty excuses in a few ways. 
First, they have found fuel production to be the proximate cause of fuel 
consumption.173 In San Juan Citizens Alliance v. Bureau of Land Management, a 2018 
case challenging an EA related to leasing several parcels for oil and gas, the Bureau 
claimed that downstream emissions from all uses of the oil and gas, including 
combustion, were not proximately caused “indirect effects” and could thus be 
ignored.174  The court rejected this argument, noting that several courts had 
determined that consumption-related downstream emissions were indirect effects 
and that these effects should be accounted for in NEPA analyses as early as feasible.175 
 
170. Id. at 3. 
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1208, 1229–30 (D. Colo. 2015); Dine Citizens Against Ruining Our Env't v. U.S. Office of Surface 
Mining Reclamation & Enforcement, 82 F. Supp. 3d 1201, 1213 (D. Colo. 2015). 
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175. Id. at 1242–43. 




Notably, in this case, a generalized discussion of the perils of climate change without 
a more specific accounting of the effects of the project at issue did not pass muster.176 
In several courts’ eyes, the existence of a known end-user, like a specific power plant, 
further undermines future self-restraint arguments about downstream emissions.177 
In such cases, “there is virtually no uncertainty regarding when, where, and how” the 
fuel extracted will be combusted.178  
Second, agencies may not rely on anticipated fuel use to estimate project 
benefits but decline to use those anticipated amounts to quantify downstream 
emissions. In the 2019 case Citizens for a Healthy Community v. Bureau of Land 
Management, the District Court of Colorado found that if an agency relies on certain 
assumptions to estimate a project’s benefits, it must also consider costs related to 
those assumptions.179 The Bureau relied on production estimates to summarize the 
benefits of a master development plan for natural gas wells but claimed those 
estimates were too speculative to rely on for the purposes of emissions 
quantification.180 The court found that the Bureau acted in an arbitrary and capricious 
fashion in producing this explanation. 181 This reasoning reflected the court’s opinion 
the preceding year in Wilderness Workshop v. Bureau of Land Management, in which 
the Bureau arbitrarily cited fossil fuel extraction predictions to tout a project’s 
benefits but claimed these projections were speculative when considering 
downstream emissions.182  
Courts are more receptive to claims about uncertainty in the context of 
cumulative impacts, which include fossil fuel impacts beyond those of the project at 
hand. In Citizens for a Healthy Community, the District of Colorado demanded 
quantification of downstream emissions as indirect effects but upheld the Bureau’s 
generalized discussion of cumulative impacts.183 In the Bureau’s cumulative impacts 
discussion, the agency described GHG effects generally and provided quantities of 
statewide emissions.184 The court credited the agency’s explanation that it lacked 
“standardized protocols or specific levels of significance by which to quantify climate 
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impacts.”185 In Wilderness Workshop, the court similarly found the cumulative impacts 
discussion of climate change was sufficient, holding that more specific analyses were 
better reserved for specific well-siting decisions that would be made in the future.186 
If petitioners could point to tools agencies could use, agencies might lose this defense. 
 Third, courts have taken a narrow view of when agencies can avoid 
considering downstream greenhouse gas emissions based on the agency’s ostensible 
lack of control over such emissions—the “our hands are tied” fallacy. In 2015, the 
Office of Surface Mining, Reclamation, and Enforcement argued to the District 
Court of Colorado that it had no obligation to consider downstream emissions from 
burning coal as part of the decision to approve state mining plans.187 After all, the 
agency argued, it only possessed the power to approve or deny the plan; any 
restrictions to make the plan more environmentally friendly must begin with the 
State of Colorado.188 The court rejected this argument, finding that although the 
agency could not itself implement such regulations, the agency nonetheless had 
discretion to approve or reject the plan.189 Because downstream coal burning was a 
foreseeable indirect effect of approval, the agency must consider those downstream 
emissions as part of its decision.190 The District of Colorado rejected a similar 
argument by the same agency with respect to its failure to consider downstream coal 
combustion for another mining expansion project.191  
 In 2017, in a case commonly referred to as Sabal Trail after the name of the 
pipeline at its center,192 the D.C. Circuit adopted the same reasoning and determined 
that FERC, which approves the construction of interstate pipelines, must consider 
downstream gas combustion as indirect effects in NEPA analyses.193 The 
Commission argued it lacked statutory discretion to consider such emissions in 
deciding whether to approve pipelines.194 But the court found that because the 
Commission was required by statute to assess “the public convenience and necessity” 
of a pipeline, the agency could deny a pipeline based on environmental harm, and 
therefore the agency’s hands were not tied.195 The Court also rejected the 
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Commission’s “future self-restraint” argument. Although FERC claimed uncertainty 
as to the exact quantity of greenhouse gases that would ultimately be released from 
power plants, the court noted that the EIS included a useful proxy: an estimate of 
how much gas would be transported through the pipeline per day.196 In a subsequent 
case, the D.C. Circuit declined to make quantification of downstream emissions a 
requirement of all NEPA analyses, clarifying that assessments should be analyzed on 
a case-by-case basis.197 But the court did provide some general guidance: if agencies 
ignored downstream emissions based on an ostensible lack of information but failed 
to take reasonable steps to acquire the information—like asking the company seeking 
a permit for projected fuel numbers, for example—then the court suggested it would 
side with challengers.198 
  WildEarth Guardians v. Zinke, concerning the Wyoming lease sales in the 
Red Desert, pulled these trends together. In March 2019, the D. C. District Court 
considered environmental groups’ claims against BLM for failure to adequately 
account for climate change in its Wyoming lease sales for oil and gas extraction.199 
As discussed above, the EAs associated with these sales discussed climate change at 
a high level, failed to quantify downstream greenhouse gas emissions, and 
emphasized uncertainty as to the extent to which gas would be extracted at the wells’ 
full capacity.200 
 The D.C. District Court found that the downstream use of oil and gas was 
the “project’s entire purpose” and that downstream emissions should thus be 
considered foreseeable indirect effects of the leases.201 The court rejected the 
Bureau’s claim that it lacked authority to act on information about environmental 
harms caused by these downstream emissions. 202 Moreover, the court demanded that 
these downstream emissions either be quantified or that the agency explain in detail 
why such quantification was not reasonably possible. 203 The court also found the 
generalized discussion of cumulative impacts unsatisfactory. 204 The agency could not 
conclusively state that the project’s impacts on climate change would be dwarfed by 
the global scale of the problem. 205 Instead, the agency had to quantify the emissions 
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of its past, present, and future actions and consider them in regional and national 
contexts. 206  
 The ruling had significant impacts on the Bureau. To correct the 
shortcomings in its NEPA analyses, and possibly prevent additional adverse court 
rulings, the Bureau suspended not only the Wyoming leases at issue in WildEarth 
Guardians v. Zinke but Colorado and Utah leases as well, where the agency’s NEPA 
analysis suffered from similar flaws. 207 The suspended area amounts to roughly one 
million acres. 208 
 In sum, over the last ten years, courts have raised the bar for agencies to 
account for downstream emissions. Agencies that fail to properly account for such 
emissions will face repercussions.  
But not all agency leaders are adjusting to the courts’ position. Writing a 
concurrence in November 2017 to an order that approved an interstate natural gas 
pipeline, FERC Commissioner McNamee insisted that FERC was unable to 
consider greenhouse gas emissions under NEPA and explained that he “respectfully 
disagree[s] with the [D.C. Circuit] court’s finding that the Commission can . . . deny 
a pipeline based on environmental effects.” 209 This position placed the 
Commissioner in open defiance of the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Sabal Trail.  
 The next section discusses approaches that agencies can take to better 
account for downstream emissions. Agencies should incorporate downstream 
emissions accurately to better inform their own decisions, provide the public with 
meaningful information, and gird themselves against legal challenges. 
D. Solutions for Governmental Agencies 
 Agencies should summon the same ingenuity and thoroughness that they 
rally in calculating the upsides of projects when calculating those projects’ 
downstream emissions. If agencies use numeric estimates to determine the benefits 
of a project by estimating the amount of fuel to be extracted, transported, processed, 
and burned, then these same numbers can and should be used to estimate the project’s 
downstream emissions. Quantifying benefits but not costs is arbitrary and capricious 
when costs are just as readily quantifiable.210 
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 That some agencies are already quantifying downstream emissions points 
to the feasibility of this approach. For example, in 2017, the BLM Tres Rios Field 
Office and the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement completed 
an EA including upstream and downstream emissions associated with a coal mine 
expansion.211 Although the actual coal that would be produced and transported would 
depend on coal markets, the agencies assumed maximum allowable coal recovery as 
a conservative approach that would consider environmental impacts in a worst-case 
scenario.212 And in two 2018 EAs considering the effects of approving permits to drill 
natural gas wells, BLM quantified downstream greenhouse gas emissions as 
reasonably foreseeable indirect effects.213 The agency based emission estimates on 
common practices reported by oil and gas operators and project-specific information 
provided by the permit applicant.214 Where the Bureau lacked specific information, 
the agency made reasonable assumptions: the Bureau assumed that “completed wells 
are all brought online during the construction year” and that “100% of the produced 
minerals are eventually combusted.”215 The Bureau also relied on EPA’s combustion 
emissions factors216 to determine the gases released.217 Such practices should be 
shared within and across agencies.  
 BLM’s approach in the above EAs provides some general principles that 
agencies should adopt to account for downstream emissions. If agencies lack the 
information necessary to make emissions estimates, then agencies should seek that 
information out from parties that might have it, including the parties seeking 
permits. Failure to make a thorough investigation reflects a lack of preparation and 
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could lead to failure in the courts.218 If parties cannot provide information specific to 
the project, then agencies may still be able to rely on generally applicable assumptions 
from other representative practitioners or projects in the industry.  
 In cases of uncertainty, agencies should define the upper bound of emissions 
as those based on the combustion of the project’s maximum amount of fuel. If 
agencies wish to include a lower bound as well, they should assume that a project will 
meet at least the amount already committed to by regulated parties. For example, if 
a shipper commits to paying for a given volume of gas from a proposed pipeline, then 
agencies can assume that at least that amount of gas will be produced, transported, 
and burned as part of the project.219  
 Agencies should also seek out information from preexisting emission 
inventories. BLM has evaluated permits for natural gas wells in Colorado by relying 
on Colorado’s Comprehensive Air Resource Protection Protocol (“CARPP”) and the 
Colorado Air Resource Management Modeling Study (“CARMMS”).220 The former 
provides guidelines to assessing activities that may adversely affect air quality in 
Colorado and requires oil and gas permit seekers to submit comprehensive 
inventories of “direct and indirect emissions associated” with proposed projects.221 
CARPP includes greenhouse gas emissions in the required inventory. CARMMS, 
meanwhile, provides “cumulative analyses for multiple projected oil and gas 
development scenarios in Colorado”.222 Such inventories and modeling tools provide 
agencies with valuable information and methodology for calculating emissions.  
 Even if states lack inventories, federal agencies should examine the extent 
to which they can utilize the EPA State Inventory Tool,223 like the National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration did in an EIS considering drilling exploration in 
the Arctic.224 To the extent possible, federal agencies and states should work together 
 
218. See Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Dep't of Navy, 422 F.3d 174, 185 (4th Cir. 2005) (stating that the 
“hard look” requirement “encompasses a thorough investigation into the environmental impacts of an 
agency's action”) (emphasis added); see also Am. Wild Horse Pres. Campaign v. Perdue, 873 F.3d 914, 
931 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (finding that an agency’s EA did not “accurately identif[y] the relevant 
environmental concern”— and instead took a “head-in-the-sand approach” which the court stated “is the 
antithesis of NEPA's requirement that an agency’s environmental analysis candidly confront the relevant 
environmental concerns”). 
219. HEIN ET AL., supra note 33, at 25. 
220. BLM, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT: CRESTONE PEAK REGNIER FARMS APDS, DOI-
BLM-CO-F020-2019-0016 EA 12 (2019). 
221. COLO. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., COMPREHENSIVE AIR RESOURCE PROTECTION 
PROTOCOL (CARPP) 4–7 (2015). 
222. BLM, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT: CRESTONE PEAK REGNIER FARMS APDS, DOI-
BLM-CO-F020-2019-0016 EA 12 (2019). 
223. State Inventory and Projection Tool, ENV’T. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/state 
localenergy/state-inventory-and-projection-tool (last updated Nov. 26, 2019). 
224. NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., EFFECTS OF OIL & GAS ACTIVITIES IN THE 
ARCTIC OCEAN FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 3-22–3-23 (2016). 




to develop informational inventories and modeling tools for greenhouse gas 
emissions. These tools can borrow techniques from other sources. For example, the 
United Nations has released developed methodologies and produced data to aid 
countries in calculating greenhouse gas inventories.225 The United States has used 
these methods in calculating its own nationwide greenhouse gas inventory.226 
 Although agencies need not wait for CEQ to implement best practices, 
CEQ plays an important role in promulgating guidance for agencies and 
standardizing agency approaches. After CEQ released final guidance requiring 
agencies to consider greenhouse gas emissions in 2016, the Bureau of Ocean Energy 
Management (“BOEM”) cooperated with other federal agencies to “prepare a report 
quantifying both upstream and downstream emissions related to . . . oil and gas 
production and consumption.”227 BOEM specifically cited CEQ’s guidance as 
guiding its “full lifecycle” approach.228 While the report still contained some flaws in 
assessing net greenhouse gas emissions as a result of energy substitution errors, 
discussed in Part IV, it was nonetheless a step in the right direction for NEPA’s twin 
aims of informed agency decision-making and public participation. Such reports both 
standardize an agency’s own decisions and can improve the NEPA analyses of sister 
agencies.  
 Agencies have many tools at their disposal to meet courts’ growing demands 
with respect to accounting for downstream emissions in NEPA analyses. The next 
Part will discuss an area in which the courts’ mandates are less clear. 
III. ACCOUNTING FOR UPSTREAM EMISSIONS 
 Courts have not examined upstream emissions from greenhouse gases to 
the same extent that they have examined downstream emissions. As a result, there is 
less judicial consensus that such emissions must be covered in NEPA analyses.229 But 
to meet the twin goals of NEPA—to fully consider governmental decisions and to 
accurately inform the public of environmental consequences—agencies must consider 
upstream emissions in their analyses. 
 
225. ENV’T. PROT. AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 
1990-2007 ES-1 (2009) (reporting on greenhouse gas emission trends completed to comply with the U.S.’s 
obligations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change).  
226. Id. 
227. BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., GULF OF MEXICO OCS OIL AND GAS LEASE SALE: 
2017, CENTRAL PLANNING AREA LEASE SALE 247, FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
STATEMENT 4–11 (2016). 
228. Id.; accord BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., FORWARD TO OCS OIL AND NATURAL GAS: 




229. See infra Part III.C. 
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A. What Are Upstream Emissions? 
 Upstream emissions, as the name suggests, are those emissions that occur 
earlier in the supply chain relative to the project under consideration.230 In the fossil 
fuel context, upstream emissions are typically those created by the extraction of fuel 
required for a project, and sometimes by the processing and transportation of fuel as 
well.231 For example, establishing a coal mine affects the climate in various ways. The 
coal company may strip away carbon-consuming forest to make way for mining 
equipment.232 Methane leaks into the air when machines carve up the rock that held 
the gas captive.233 And equipment—the trucks that haul coal on site, for instance—
emit their own greenhouse gases.234 Such emissions are “direct effects” if the project 
under consideration is a lease for coal mining, but they are upstream effects for 
transportation projects, like building a railroad to haul coal.   
As with downstream emissions, under NEPA, agencies must account for 
these upstream emissions in more than one regulatory context: as “indirect effects” 
or as direct effects of “connected actions.”235  
B. Regulatory Approach to Upstream Emissions 
 The federal government has generally fallen short of its duty to account for 
upstream emissions. As with downstream emissions, agencies often claim that 
upstream emissions are too speculative to consider. 
 The Mountain Valley Pipeline, a proposed 303-mile natural gas line that 
would snake through Virginia, 236 West Virginia,237 the Jefferson National Forest, 238 
 
230. Upstream Emissions, EUROPEAN COMM’N, https://knowledge4policy.ec.europa.eu/glossary-
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and the Appalachian Trail, 239 offers a useful example of a myopic EIS produced 
during the Obama administration.  
 Although the 2016 EIS discusses and quantifies greenhouse gas emissions 
from the project, including those associated with construction,240 operation of 
compressors,241 and downstream combustion,242 the agency does not quantify the 
upstream emissions that might be associated with induced greater natural gas 
production. In fact, the agency barely acknowledges qualitatively that the pipeline 
might drive greater upstream production of fossil fuels.243 In its discussion of 
cumulative impacts from climate change, the EIS first describes the crisis in a general 
way through a stark, multi-page summary, listing environmental woes ranging from 
extreme heat events to decreased water availability.244 But the closest the EIS comes 
to discussing upstream emissions is to suggest that the project might displace some 
coal use, thereby counteracting some of the project’s greenhouse emissions, because 
coal produces more carbon dioxide than natural gas.245 The Fourth Circuit eventually 
found the EIS insufficient on different grounds,246 putting the project on hold.247 
Nonetheless, the EIS demonstrates considerable room for improvement in the 
consideration of upstream effects. 
 Administrations of both parties may have a history of paying upstream 
greenhouse gas emissions short shrift, but recent court decisions could augur a 
growing judicial expectation that such emissions be considered in NEPA analyses. 
The next section discusses the judicial perspective on upstream emissions. 
C. Case Precedent 
 Few courts have analyzed agencies’ failure to address upstream greenhouse 
gas emissions thus far. Courts have sided with agencies, but the bases for their 
holdings do not necessarily absolve agencies of their general responsibility to 
consider upstream emissions. Moreover, other precedent embraces logic that could 
extend to upstream emission cases.  
 
239. Id.  
240. Id. at 4-502, 4-503 tbl.4.11. 1-5. 
241. Id. at 4-507 to 4.508 tbl.4.11.1-7. 
242. Id. at 4-620 tbl.4.13.2-2. 
243. See id. at 4-620 (limiting upstream effects discussion to a somewhat rosy prediction that the 
project could displace coal and decrease emissions). 
244. Id. at 4-617, 4-618, 4-619. 
245. Id. at 4-620. 
246. Mountain Valley Pipeline and the Jefferson National Forest, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 
https://www.fs.usda.gov/detail/gwj/home/?cid=stelprd3827827 (last visited Dec. 4, 2019). 
247. Sierra Club, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 897 F.3d 582, 596 (4th Cir. 2018) (discussing vacating 
Forest Service’s failure to comply with NEPA by adopting a sedimentation analysis in the EIS that it had 
previously critiqued). 
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 The earliest case considering upstream greenhouse gas emissions for natural 
gas pipelines was Sierra Club v. Clinton, a 2010 case in which the District Court of 
Minnesota considered a challenge to the construction of two crude oil pipelines, one 
domestic and one crossing the border from the United States into Canada.248 The 
international pipeline required approval from the State Department, which prepared 
an EIS for the project and issued a permit for the construction and operation of the 
pipeline.249 Petitioners challenged the EIS for failing to consider, as indirect effects, 
the upstream emissions the international pipeline might cause, including increased 
natural gas extraction in Canada driven by cheaper transport to the United States.250  
 The court, however, did not find that the causal connection between the 
pipeline’s construction and any increased extraction was clear enough to require 
consideration under NEPA.251 The pipeline, the Court noted, was not the only means 
of transporting oil from the tar sands and therefore reasoned that the oil would be 
extracted regardless of whether the pipeline was built.252 Furthermore, the Court 
deferred to analysis of the energy market that listed several reasons that Canadian oil 
production would be ramped up, but omitted references to increased pipeline 
capacity.253 Finally, the Court noted that oil sands development fell under Canadian 
jurisdiction.254 
 Although the decision in Clinton cuts against requiring the consideration of 
upstream emissions, the case’s reasoning is colored by the facts of the project in issue. 
The court’s concerns might be addressed by entering a report into the record 
reflecting the link between increased transport and induced production. Such a report 
today would have more empirical examples to cite than was the case in 2010. For 
example, the construction of the pipeline at issue in Clinton enabled the further 
expansion of production, doubling the capacity numbers assumed by the court.255 
 More recently, in 2019, the D.C. Circuit declined to require consideration 
of upstream emissions of greenhouse gases but did so on narrow grounds. In 
Birckhead v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, petitioners challenged FERC’s 
approval of a natural gas pipeline without considering natural gas production induced 
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by the pipeline’s construction as indirect effects.256 Although the court seemed 
skeptical that the agency would be able to meaningfully consider such emissions 
without knowing the sites of induced production,257 the court suggested that the 
petitioners might have prevailed if they had urged the Commission to seek further 
information about upstream emissions from the company constructing the 
pipeline.258 Because of petitioners’ failure to make a claim on this ground, the Court 
was “left with no basis for concluding that the Commission acted arbitrarily or 
capriciously or otherwise violated NEPA in declining to consider [upstream 
emissions].”259 
 Although agencies prevailed in the cases discussed above, other cases 
suggest courts may demand more of agencies. The Ninth Circuit has called for 
consideration of upstream emissions in the greenhouse gas context. In 2011, the 
Court required the Surface Transportation Board to revise an EIS and approval for 
a coal railroad because the EIS failed to consider the impacts, including methane 
emissions, from upstream coal mines.260 At the time of the EIS, the coal mines did 
not yet exist, and the agency deemed them “too speculative to be considered 
reasonably foreseeable future actions.”261 But the Court disagreed, noting that the 
Board had cited the coal mine development as a reason to justify the proposal to build 
the railroad.262 Thus, the Board should have considered the impacts from coal, 
including methane leaks,263 as a cumulative effect to be considered along with the 
other effects of the railroad.264 
 A D.C. Circuit case discussed in Part II, Sabal Trail,265 also relies on logic 
that ought to apply to upstream greenhouse gas emissions. That case determined that 
FERC must consider downstream greenhouse gas emissions as indirect effects and 
quantify them if possible.266 The court rejected FERC’s claim that quantification was 
impractical merely because the quantification depended on uncertain variables 
including the “operating decisions of individual plants and the demand for electricity 
 
256. 925 F.3d 510, 516–17 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
257. See id. at 517 (discussing how petitioners have no information about the location or number of 
wells where production would be induced). 
258. Id.  
259. Id. at 518. 
260. N. Plains Res. Council, Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 668 F.3d 1067, 1082 (9th Cir. 2011). 
261. N. Plains Res. Council, 668 F.3d at 1082.   
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263. Id. at 1077 (introducing this section of concerns as failure to adequately consider cumulative 
effects, including methane). 
264. Id. at 1081. 
265. See supra Part II. 
266. 867 F.3d 1357, 1374 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
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in the region.”267 The court insisted that NEPA required “reasonable forecasting” 
and called upon the agency to “make educated assumptions about an uncertain 
future.”268 For the same reason that the court found downstream emissions 
reasonably foreseeable indirect effects, courts may find upstream emissions 
reasonably foreseeable indirect effects. 
 One distinction between downstream emissions and upstream emissions 
may make courts more inclined to require agencies to consider the former than to 
consider the latter: downstream emissions cases tend to have built-in emissions 
estimates for courts to invoke. That is, as discussed in Part II, EISs frequently include 
estimates of the amount of fuel a project will produce in order to illustrate a project’s 
energy upside. Judges can point to these estimates as proxies for downstream 
emissions.269 Upstream emissions cases may lack a similarly useful number. 
 However, Birckhead can provide guidance.270 Recall that the D.C. Circuit 
suggested that environmental petitioners might have prevailed if they had challenged 
FERC’s failure to solicit estimates of induced upstream production from the permit-
seeking company.271 The implication is that if petitioners challenge agencies’ failure 
to solicit relevant information, they might prevail. Both to reach more informed 
decisions and gird themselves against legal challenges, agencies should make efforts 
to collect information relevant to upstream emissions.  
 The cases above focus on EIS analyses, but precedent can also guide 
agencies’ approaches to EAs. Uncertainty about the amount of upstream emissions 
should not support a FONSI. Rather, EAs should only result in FONSIs if the 
agencies can affirmatively conclude that environmental impacts will not be 
significant. CEQ regulations require agencies to procure information absent 
“exorbitant” costs, and where costs are exorbitant, agencies must still discuss the 
uncertainty in detail in an EIS.272 Multiple court cases have upheld this principle.273 
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Thus, rather than issuing a FONSI when there is uncertainty, agencies should 
develop an EIS, and through that process gather relevant information on emissions 
in order to determine whether the environmental effects are significant. Again, 
cursory EAs may invite legal challenges. 
D. Solutions for Governmental Agencies 
 As the cases above illustrate, agencies avoid considering upstream emissions 
by claiming such emissions are too speculative to estimate. But even as some agencies 
claim inability to calculate these emissions, other agencies have begun using tools to 
do just that. 
 First, Birckhead shows that agencies should ask for as much information as 
possible from companies seeking permits for projects. Companies likely have 
projections about the amount of fuel production and transportation that will occur if 
the project proceeds, as such estimates underlie the economic rationale and financing 
for the project.274 Moreover, any questions as to the validity or completeness of such 
information can and should be explored through the NEPA process, including by 
soliciting public comment. Securing high-quality information on direct and indirect 
emissions helps agencies more accurately assess those emissions, and in turn, enables 
agencies to determine whether environmental effects are significant, whether 
alternative options should be selected, and whether mitigation measures should be 
implemented. If agencies fail to consider this information and provide it to the 
public, the federal government will fail NEPA’s twin purposes of promoting 
informed decisionmaking and sharing information with the public.275 Moreover, if 
agencies fail to seek out this information to inform NEPA analyses, petitioners may 
sue with success. 
 As with downstream emissions, if agencies cannot obtain project-specific 
information, agencies should use reasonable assumptions to account for upstream 
emissions. Thus, agencies should produce studies and reports that can inform and 
standardize assumptions. Some agencies have already done so. In 2012, the U.S. 
Energy Information Administration published a study determining the effect 
increased natural gas exports would have on domestic natural gas production and 
found a sixty-to-seventy percent increase in production as the likely result.276 And in 
2014, the Department of Energy published a study of the lifecycle of greenhouse gas 
emissions associated with liquefied natural gas exports to foreign markets as 
 
274. See, e.g., Melissa Denchak, What Is the Keystone Pipeline?, NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL (Apr. 7, 
2017), https://www.nrdc.org/stories/what-keystone-pipeline (sharing projections that the Keystone XL 
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275. COUNCIL ON ENV’T. QUALITY, MAJOR CASES INTERPRETING THE NATIONAL 
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Fall 2020 Implementing NEPA in the Era of Climate Change  39
compared to emissions associated with domestic delivery and consumption.277As 
discussed in the context of downstream emissions, the Bureau of Ocean Energy 
Management also produced a greenhouse gas emissions lifecycle report in 2016 that 
could inform upstream emissions estimates.278 
  Some agencies have estimated upstream emissions for specific projects. In 
a 2014 liquefied natural gas export decision, the Department of Energy assessed the 
greenhouse gas emissions associated with induced upstream natural gas 
production.279 The Department determined that for every increase of one trillion 
cubic feet of gas production, an 6.8 million metric tons of greenhouse gases would be 
released per year. 280 We advise that, as with downstream emissions, agencies should 
base estimates on maximum use of a given project’s fuel capacity and calculate how 
that new supply of fuel will affect demand and ultimately drive upstream emissions. 
Again, if agencies wish to make a lower bound estimate as well, agencies should use 
no number lower than the amount of fuel promised in existing contracts. 
 Agencies already use similar strategies to account for other kinds of 
uncertainty. For example, FERC allows applicants to rely on generic, default studies 
to prove a market need for projects.281 Whether using information from regulated 
parties or making reasonable assumptions about upstream emissions, agencies should 
not only discuss these emissions qualitatively but also quantitatively wherever 
possible.  
 In sum, to comply with NEPA’s legal requirements, agencies should 
consider upstream emissions in their analyses. Courts have not yet arrived at a 
consensus demanding quantification of upstream greenhouse gas emissions, but 
reasoning in cases mandating downstream quantification extends to upstream 
emissions as well. Thus, agencies may be vulnerable in court if they fail to quantify 
such emissions. Furthermore, agencies have the tools necessary to meaningfully 
improve their consideration of upstream emissions. Cries of speculation or 
impracticability will ring hollow as information about greenhouse gas impacts 
continues to grow each year.  
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IV. ENERGY SUBSTITUTION ANALYSIS: THE MYTH OF 
INCONSEQUENTIAL FOSSIL FUEL PROJECTS 
In order to arrive at a reasonably accurate estimate of expected greenhouse 
gas emissions associated with project proposals, agencies must not only use accurate 
data on emissions but must consider the state of the energy market, whereby some 
energy resources act as substitutes for one another, with consequences for resulting 
emissions.282 This is commonly known as energy substitution analysis.283 Conducted 
properly, energy substitution analysis enables agencies to arrive at an accurate 
understanding of expected emissions, both upstream and downstream.284 However, 
agencies have often made flawed assumptions about the effect of their projects on 
the energy market and resulting emissions.    
These flawed assumptions fall into two main categories. First, agencies have 
claimed that their project approvals will have no effect on greenhouse gas emissions 
because absent the project, another source of supply would be developed elsewhere 
at identical cost, resulting in identical emissions.285 This is known as the fallacy of 
“perfect substitution:” the effect of which is to make fossil fuel projects appear 
inconsequential from a climate change standpoint.286 Agencies that make such 
assertions frequently ignore basic principles of supply and demand and make 
irrational assumptions about the energy market and long-term demand for fossil fuels 
in a rapidly warming world. A variant of this argument is that in the “no action” 
 
282. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., FUEL COMPETITION IN POWER GENERATION AND 
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F.3d at 1236 (describing BLM’s flawed perfect substitution analysis and stating, “[p]rioritizing the carbon 
emissions and global warming analysis in the RODs suggests that this question was critical to the decision 
to open the leases for bidding”).   
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underestimates the effect on climate change)”). 
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alternative, about ninety-five percent of the same resource would be produced at 
identical cost, resulting in nearly identical emissions.287  
Second, while agencies frequently assume perfect or near-perfect 
substitution for greenhouse gas emissions, they often ignore substitution effects 
altogether when reporting the expected economic benefits from a project, such as 
royalties and tax revenue. A project’s climate harms are essentially erased by waving 
the magic wand of perfect substitution, while projected revenue and other economic 
benefits are treated as entirely dependent on the project being approved.288 We call 
this the fallacy of “all upside,” whereby the project appears to have significant 
economic benefits, yet little or no climate consequences. This error is multiplied due 
to the failure of agencies to use an existing tool like the Interagency Working Group’s 
social cost of greenhouse gases to monetize climate costs, as discussed in Part V. Such 
misrepresentation strikes at the heart of NEPA, as the statute’s primary goal is to 
inform the public and decisionmakers about the likely effects of governmental 
approvals, yet it distorts the project’s identified costs and benefits.  
Invoking either fallacy can render agency analysis arbitrary and capricious, 
inviting judicial reproach. Most, but not all, federal courts to have considered these 
issues have required agencies to make assumptions supported by basic principles of 
supply and demand and to use the best available data on the energy market.289 
However, some courts have deferred to agencies despite analytical flaws, especially 
where technical or complex modeling decisions are at issue.290 After describing these 
two primary pitfalls and how courts have responded to them, we describe how 
agencies can, and have in the past, used accurate assumptions and models to conduct 
proper substitution analysis. By conducting energy substitution analysis in the right 
way, the public and decisionmakers can gain a clearer picture of the net costs or 
benefits of projects, and climate change consequences are illuminated, as opposed to 
swept under the rug. 
A. What is Energy Substitution Analysis?   
In the modern energy market, energy resources like coal, oil, natural gas, 
nuclear, wind, and solar act as substitutes for one another, especially with respect to 
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electricity generation.291 As prices for certain resources rise and fall, substitute 
sources become more attractive on the market.292 Further, the consumption of 
different resources for energy produces different amounts of greenhouse gases and 
other air pollutants.293 Generally speaking, decreases in the supply of a resource tend 
to increase price; and increases in prices will lead to decreases in demand for that 
resource, with consequences for resulting emissions.294  
When agencies conduct NEPA analysis, they must describe the 
environmental consequences of the action alternative compared to the “no action” 
alternative.295 In describing resulting emissions for each alternative, agencies often 
consider energy substitution, whereby production of a given resource or approval of 
an energy infrastructure project, such as a pipeline, will affect resource prices, 
consumption, and resulting emissions.296 In order to conduct energy substitution 
analysis, agencies must account for basic principles of supply and demand. Flooding 
the market with a large amount of coal, oil, or natural gas lowers the market price of 
that resource, resulting in increased demand for the resource and increased 
consumption.297 This, in turn, has implications for greenhouse gas emissions: 
producing more carbon-intensive resources like coal and oil will displace some 
cleaner resources like renewables and natural gas, and reduce energy conservation, 
thereby increasing net greenhouse gas emissions.298 Conversely, producing more 
renewable energy would be expected to lower net greenhouse gas emissions after 
accounting for energy substitution.299  
 
291. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., FUEL COMPETITION IN POWER GENERATION AND 
ELASTICITIES OF SUBSTITUTION 1–4 (2012). 
292. See, e.g., U.S. Renewable Electricity Generation Has Doubled Since 2008, U.S ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN., (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=38752 (“Growth in . . . wind 
and solar, has been driven by federal and state policies and declining costs.”); Anna Mikulska & Michael 
Maher, Who’s Winning The Battle To Replace Coal?, FORBES (May 17, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites
/thebakersinstitute/2016/05/17/whos-winning-the-battle-to-replace-coal/#4153ec1a765d.  
293. For example, solar and wind energy produce zero GHG emissions, while burning 
subbituminous coal from Wyoming’s Powder River Basin (the primary source of coal in the United States) 
emits 212 pounds of carbon dioxide per million British thermal units (Btu). See B.D. Hong & E.R. Slatick, 
Carbon Dioxide Emission Factors for Coal, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/coal/product
ion/quarterly/co2_article/co2.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2020). 
294. See, e.g., Natural Gas Explained: Factors Affecting Natural Gas Prices, U.S. ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/natural-gas/factors-affecting-natural-gas-prices.php (last 
updated July 12, 2019). 
295. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332; 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.1, 1502.14(a)–(b), (d).  
296. See infra Section IV.B. 
297. See N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 74–78, 80–81 (5th ed. 2008). 
298. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., FUEL COMPETITION IN POWER GENERATION AND 
ELASTICITIES OF SUBSTITUTION 13 (2012).  
299. See Renewable Energy Explained, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/energy 
explained/renewable-sources (last updated June 27, 2019) (“Renewable energy plays an important role in 
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Agencies can choose from several sophisticated models to evaluate the effect 
of alternatives on the energy market, such as ICF International’s Integrated Planning 
Model (IPM)300; the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s National Energy 
Modeling System (NEMS)301; and MarketSim,302 which the Bureau of Ocean 
Energy Management uses to analyze lease sale scenarios in its offshore planning 
process.303 Each of these models has benefits and drawbacks that should be 
considered and disclosed in an environmental review process.304 This Article does 
not discuss the nuances of each model but makes high-level recommendations for 
transparently disclosing modeling inputs and assumptions, and conducting proper 
energy substitution analysis, at the end of this Part.  
B. Regulatory Approach to Energy Substitution Analysis  
Federal agencies have been inconsistent in how they conduct energy 
substitution analysis and have often made irrational assumptions that make the 
climate change effects of even massive fossil fuel projects appear small or non-
existent. This head-in-the-sand approach to greenhouse gas emissions analysis is a 
disservice to decisionmakers and the public, who must develop solutions for the 
mounting climate crisis on an ever-shorter timeline.   
1. The Fallacy of “Perfect Substitution,” Whereby Fossil Fuel Projects 
Have Little or No Effect on Greenhouse Gas Emissions  
In several NEPA documents for fossil fuel-related projects, such as mineral 
lease sales, programmatic plans that guide future leasing, and interstate natural gas 
pipelines, agencies have made flawed assumptions to arrive at perfect substitution, 
or its close relative, nearly perfect substitution.   
In BLM’s 2010 EIS for the Wright Area coal leases, located in the Powder 
River Basin region of Wyoming, BLM reasoned that if it were to select the no-action 
alternative (not leasing the coal), other mines would increase production to entirely 
replace the two billion tons of coal anticipated from the leases, such that the amount 
 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Using renewable energy can reduce the use of fossil fuels, which are 
major sources of U.S. carbon dioxide emissions.”).  
300. Integrated Planning Model, ICF Int’l Inc., https://www.icf.com/technology/ipm (last visited 
June 14, 2020). 
301. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., NATIONAL ENERGY MODELING SYSTEM: AN OVERVIEW 2018 
(2019). 
302. U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., CONSUMER SURPLUS AND 
ENERGY SUBSTITUTES FOR OCS OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION: THE 2015 REVISED MARKET 
SIMULATION MODEL (MARKETSIM) (2015). 
303. See also HOWARD, MODELING CHOICE, supra note 282, at 2.  
304. For more information on the benefits and drawbacks of these three models, see id.   




of coal burned in the United States—and the resulting carbon dioxide and methane 
emissions—would be identical whether or not the leases were approved.305 The leases 
would produce up to 230 million tons of coal per year—more than 20 percent of the 
total U.S. coal used for electricity in 2010.306 BLM did not appear to use any 
modeling to calculate the greenhouse gas emissions in the leasing and no leasing 
scenarios.307 The final EIS was challenged in federal court, resulting in an adverse 
decision for the agency, as discussed in the caselaw subsection below.   
Even where agencies do model energy substitution effects, they sometimes 
fail to rely upon certain results or make arbitrary assumptions that strongly affect 
their analysis. Only a tenacious observer is likely to identify these errors; readers 
must follow the agency through a “choose your own adventure” style cascade of 
flawed assumptions, often buried in technical documents outside the actual EIS or 
EA in question. Needless to say, this approach does not encourage meaningful public 
participation.  
This cascade of faulty yet well-buried energy market assumptions is present 
in BOEM’s NEPA analysis for its five-year offshore leasing program.308 The agency 
prepared a detailed assessment of the upstream and downstream greenhouse gas 
emissions associated with offshore oil and natural gas leasing pursuant to its five-year 
program for 2017 to 2022.309 The Bureau quantified GHG emissions from the 
production, processing, transportation, and consumption of oil and gas that could be 
produced in three different price scenarios.310 However, it declined to rely upon the 
actual energy substitution analysis that it conducted and instead, “assumed that . . . 
foreign sources of oil will substitute for reduced OCS supply, and the production 
and transport of that foreign oil would emit more [greenhouse gases].”311 As a result, 
the Bureau found that the “no action” alternative—not leasing any offshore tracts in 
the United States for oil production—would emit more greenhouse gases than the 
 
305. BLM, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE WRIGHT AREA COAL 
LEASE APPLICATIONS 4-141 (2010) (“It is not likely that selection of the No Action alternatives would 
result in a decrease of U.S. CO2 emissions attributable to coal mining and coal-burning power plants in 
the longer term, because there are multiple other sources of coal that, while not having the cost, 
environmental, or safety advantages, could supply the demand for coal.”).   
306. WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 870 F.3d 1222, 1227, n. 2 (10th Cir. 
2017). 
307. See id. at 1227–28. 
308. See U.S. BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., 2017-2022 OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL 
AND GAS LEASING PROPOSED FINAL PROGRAM 2–6 (2016), https://perma.cc/KRV7-MV98 [hereinafter 
BOEM, 2017-2022 Proposed Final Leasing Program].   
309. U.S. BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., OCS OIL AND NATURAL GAS: POTENTIAL 
LIFECYCLE GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SOCIAL COST OF CARBON 15 (2016), 
https://perma.Cc/2mxn-Qxbv [hereinafter BOEM, LIFECYCLE GHG REPORT].  
310. Id. at v, 29-31.  
311. Id. at Foreword. 
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leasing alternative, due to perfect substitution of domestic and foreign oil and greater 
transportation-related emissions from foreign production.312  
However, the Bureau’s key assumption was contrary to its own findings in 
a separate report on the offshore leasing program’s lifecycle greenhouse gas 
emissions. There, it used MarketSim to model energy substitution. The Bureau 
found that:  
 
. . . for the global oil market, MarketSim substitutions under the 
No Action Alternative show a reduction in foreign oil 
consumption of approximately one, four, and six billion barrels of 
oil for the low-, mid-, and high-price scenarios, respectively, over 
the duration of the 2017–2022 Program. GHG impacts for this 
reduction in oil consumption, as well as possible changes for 
natural gas, are not captured in this analysis.313  
 
Translating this projected reduction in foreign oil consumption into greenhouse gas 
emissions, the “no action” alternative would decrease global carbon dioxide emissions 
by up to 2.3 billion metric tons over the duration of the 2017-2022 program,314 or 
more than the annual CO2 emissions from the entire U.S. transportation sector.315 
This finding makes sense as a matter of supply and demand: decreasing global oil 
supply by billions of barrels should lead to higher global oil prices, and consequently 
less oil consumption and greenhouse gas emissions.316 However, the agency 
downplayed its own findings and stated that it would not rely on them, writing, 
“[e]xcluding the foreign oil and gas markets is reasonable. Oil consumption in each 
country is different, and BOEM does not have information related to which 
countries would consume less oil.”317 Thus, while the agency used MarketSim to 
conduct energy market substitution analysis, it omitted relevant information from its 
EIS.   
 
312. Id. at 24, tbl.8-1; BOEM, 2017-2022 PROPOSED FINAL LEASING PROGRAM, supra note 307, 
at 5-23. The document provides detail on possible offshore production substitutes: for example, foreign 
imports would replace 63% of anticipated production under a No Sale option; 22% of onshore production; 
and 7% of reduced consumption. BOEM, 2017-2022 PROPOSED FINAL LEASING PROGRAM, supra note 
307 at 6-17.  
313. BOEM, LIFECYCLE GHG REPORT, supra note 308, at 23. 
314. Id. at 24; see also Peter Erickson, Final Obama Administration Analysis Shows Expanding Oil 
Supply Increases CO2, STOCKHOLM ENV’T INST. (Jan. 30, 2017), https://perma.cc/4MX6-F7QD 
(translating oil consumption projections from BOEM’s Lifecycle Greenhouse Gas Emissions report into 
estimated carbon dioxide emissions). 
315. One year of U.S. transportation sector CO2 emissions is about 1.7 billion metric tons CO2. 
EPA, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990-2014 ES-7 tbl.ES-2 (2016). 
316. See Peter Erickson, Obama’s Arctic Oil Ban Advances Key Climate Test, SEATTLE TIMES (Dec. 
30, 2016), https://perma.cc/FP59-YD2L. 
317. BOEM, Lifecycle GHG Report, supra note 308, at 23. 




Perhaps as a direct result of the Wright Area coal lease litigation in which 
the Tenth Circuit ruled against it,318 BLM has begun offering a different flavor of 
the perfect substitution argument. In recent NEPA documents, BLM has claimed 
that in the “no action” alternative, other production of the same resource would occur 
elsewhere, replacing about ninety-five percent of the resource.319 In other words, 
there is nearly perfect substitution. In reaching this conclusion, however, BLM has 
relied upon the MarketSim model, and has repeated BOEM’s error of ignoring any 
changes in foreign oil demand.320 This makes BLM’s energy substitution analysis a 
house of cards, as it relies on the same flawed assumptions detailed above.   
For instance, in BLM’s EIS for oil and natural gas production in the Arctic 
National Wildlife Refuge—prepared pursuant to the directive in the 2017 Tax Cut 
and Jobs Act to hold two lease sales in the Refuge within seven years321—the agency 
found nearly perfect substitution in the “no leasing” scenario and thereby 
downplayed the climate change consequences of opening the Refuge to oil and gas 
extraction.322 BLM concluded that if, under the no action alternative, supply from 
the Refuge is reduced by up to ten billion barrels of oil, substitute domestic and 
foreign energy sources will fill in almost all of the shortfall, with U.S. oil demand 
decreasing by only 3.9 percent.323 
The agency’s energy substitution analysis had serious deficiencies. Because 
BLM adopted BOEM’s assumptions about foreign demand, “the reduction in foreign 
consumption of oil and gas in a no action analysis is not taken into account.”324 But 
according to BOEM’s actual runs of MarketSim in the context of the offshore oil and 
gas leasing, taking 8 billion barrels of U.S. oil production off the global market would 
result in “a reduction in foreign oil consumption of approximately . . . 4 . . . billion 
barrels of oil” in the mid-price scenario.325 A fifty percent reduction in foreign 
demand is significantly more than zero change in foreign demand.   
In its draft EIS for the Willow Master Plan, BLM likewise claimed that 
more than ninety-five percent of downstream emissions from new federal oil and 
natural production described in the plan would, absent the project, be offset by 
 
318. See infra Part IV.C.  
319. See, e.g., U.S. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., WILLOW MASTER DEVELOPMENT PLAN DRAFT 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 26 (Table 3.2.2); App. E.2B, p.3 (Aug. 2019) (stating, for 
instance, “Under all three action alternatives, more than 96% of the anticipated production would displace 
other carbon-emitting fuel sources.”). [hereinafter WILLOW PLAN DEIS]. 
320. See BOEM, LIFECYCLE GHG REPORT, supra note 308, at 23. 
321. LAURA B. COMAY ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ARCTIC NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE 
(ANWR): An Overview 9-10 (2018), https://perma.cc/UNW9-FYK9.   
322. See ARCTIC FINAL EIS, supra note 286, at 3-7, 3-8. 
323. Id. at 3-7. 
324. BOEM, LIFECYCLE GHG REPORT, supra note 308, at 23 (emphasis added).   
325. Id.  
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increased emissions in other locations.326 The EIS analyzed the “no action” 
alternative and three development alternatives proposed by ConocoPhillips on oil 
and gas leases in the National Petroleum Reserve in Alaska.327 If the EIS is approved, 
ConocoPhillips could build up to 5 drill sites, airstrips, pipelines, and related 
infrastructure, and produce up to 130,000 barrels of oil per day over the project’s 30-
year lifespan.328 Yet, BLM’s analysis suggests that new leasing in the Willow area 
would be responsible for only five percent of the project’s generated emissions.329 
BLM did not release its full substitution analysis, and its estimates were based on 
MarketSim,330 presumably with the same flaws accepted by the agencies in other 
contexts.331  
In several NEPA documents, including the EISs for drilling in the Arctic 
Refuge and the five-year offshore leasing plan, the agencies’ energy substitution 
analysis also assumed near constant demand on the global energy market for oil and 
gas over the next forty to seventy years.332 In fact, the MarketSim model took this 
assumption as its baseline. BOEM wrote:  
 
This analysis uses a projection of near constant demand over the 
next 40–70 years using the 2016 AEO Reference Case, for which 
EIA does not assume any future changes in laws or policies other 
than what is incorporated in existing laws and policies. As 
countries, including the U.S., address climate change with 
individual policy targets, this assumption could no longer 
hold . . .333 
 
Ample peer-reviewed studies from the IPCC, U.S. Global Change Research 
Program, and others make clear that a “business as usual” approach to consuming and 
burning fossil fuels for the next forty to seventy years would lead to catastrophic 
warming and cascading ecological harms.334 In order to avert dangerous and costly 
 
326. WILLOW PLAN DEIS, supra note 318, at 26 (Table 3.2.2); App. E.2B, p.3.  
327. Id. at ES-1. 
328. Id.  
329. See id. at 26 (Table 3.2.2), app. E.2B, 5. Specifically, BLM reports that 225.157 million metric 
tons of GHG equivalence out of 237.626 million metric tons in Alternative B would be produced through 
substitute emissions under a no action alternative. Id. at 26 (Table 3.2.2). This equates to 94.75 percent.   
330. Id. at 25.  
331. See Lexi Krupp, The Interior Department Is Using Faulty Logic to Justify New Oil Projects, Audubon 
(Jan. 9, 2019) https://www.audubon.org/news/the-interior-department-using-faulty-logic-justify-new-oil-
projects.  
332. BOEM, OCS LIFECYCLE GHG REPORT, supra note 308, at 20.  
333. Id. 
334. See INTERGOV’TL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, GLOBAL 
WARMING OF 




climate change, fossil fuel demand and consumption must decrease substantially from 
current levels, well before forty to seventy years in the future.335 For this reason, 
even as the United States has withdrawn from the Paris agreement, nations around 
the world are adopting policies to reduce fossil fuel production and consumption to 
avert catastrophic climate impacts.336 
In light of these scientific findings and international action, it is irrational 
for the U.S. government to assume that global oil and gas demand will remain 
constant more than four decades into the future as the baseline for its energy market 
analysis. A far more rational approach would be to model at least two policy 
scenarios: one taking the “constant demand” approach, and the other based on fossil 
fuel consumption consistent with meeting the 1.5 or 2 degrees Celsius warming 
targets laid out in the Paris Accord.337 The second baseline would allow government 
agencies to map policy scenarios that will result in a stable climate. In part because 
of the assumption of constant demand for oil and natural gas up to the end of the 
century, the agencies are able to claim that at no point will a decrease in U.S. 
production of oil or gas under a no action alternative affect foreign consumption.338 
But that assumption is at odds with policy scenarios that predict large decreases in 
fossil fuel demand and consumption in order to meet global emissions targets.  
The assumption of constant global demand and production also infiltrates 
other findings in NEPA analyses, like this one in BLM’s Arctic Refuge Final EIS:  
 
Assuming a 70-year period for this production, . . . post-lease oil 
and gas activities could supply in the range of 0.1 to 0.5 percent of 
 
1.5°C: AN IPCC SPECIAL REPORT 15 (2018), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/05/S
R15_SPM_version_report_LR.pdf (“Pathways limiting global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited 
overshoot would require rapid and far-reaching transitions in energy, land, urban and infrastructure 
(including transport and buildings), and industrial systems (high confidence).”). See also Wuebbles, D.J., et 
al., Executive Summary, in CLIMATE SCIENCE SPECIAL REPORT: FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE 
ASSESSMENT VOLUME I 11 (2017), https://science2017.globalchange.gov/downloads/CSSR_Executive_
Summary.pdf.  
335. See id.; Ilona Otto, et al., Social Tipping Dynamics for Stabilizing Earth’s Climate by 2050, 5 PROC. 
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 2354 (2020) (“Limiting global warming to 1.5 °C as stipulated in the Paris Climate 
Agreement scientifically implies a complete net decarbonization of the world’s energy and transport 
systems, industrial production, and land use by the middle of this century.”); J. Rockström et al., A 
Roadmap for Rapid Decarbonization, 355 SCI. 1269, 1269–1271 (2017). 
336. See, e.g., Climate Change Response (Zero Carbon) Amendment Act 2019, (N.Z.); Niclas 
Rolander, Denmark Strikes Deal to Slash CO2 Emissions by 70% in a Decade, BLOOMBERG GREEN (Dec. 7, 
2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-12-07/denmark-strikes-deal-to-slash-co2-
emissions-by-70-in-a-decade; Alice Tidey, Can Europe Become 'World's First Climate-Neutral Continent'? Von 
der Leyen Thinks So, EURONEWS (Nov. 12, 2019), https://www.euronews.com/2019/12/11/european-green-
deal-eu-chief-von-der-leyen-to-unveil-measures-to-tackle-climate-emergency.  
337. Art. 2, Conference of the Parties, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev/1 (Dec. 12, 2015). 
338. See BOEM, LIFECYCLE GHG REPORT, supra note 308, at 23. 
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global oil production . . . Given that global oil production continues to 
increase, the development that could occur with the Coastal Plain 
oil and gas leasing program would represent a smaller fraction of 
global production as the years pass.339  
 
BLM assumed that the world would continue to produce and consume increasing 
amounts of oil and gas up to seventy years in the future, making the Refuge’s 
marginal contribution to global emissions relatively smaller over time.340 But 
according to experts, such a scenario of global oil and gas consumption would result 
in tens of millions of climate refugees, accelerated collapse of ice sheets and glaciers, 
and more frequent and severe droughts and storms.341 Nowhere in the EIS was this 
stark reality acknowledged.  
In short, the irrationality of BLM’s energy market assumptions is 
underscored by the profoundly damaging climate change consequences that follow 
from them.  
2. The Fallacy of “All Upside”: Inconsistent Treatment of Expected 
Revenue and Expected Emissions Places a Thumb on the Scale in 
Favor of Development  
While agencies frequently assume perfect or near-perfect substitution for 
greenhouse gas emissions, they often ignore substitution effects altogether when 
reporting expected economic benefits, such as revenue. This fallacy of “all upside” 
makes projects appear to have significant revenue and other economic benefits, yet 
little or no climate consequences. A few examples elucidate this phenomenon, which 
artificially places a thumb on the scale in favor of development.  
In the Arctic Refuge EIS discussed above, BLM took an inconsistent 
approach by monetizing economic benefits like oil and gas royalties without applying 
any energy substitution analysis while using substitution analysis to make 
downstream climate effects appear very small.342 BLM found that the “no action” 
alternative would result in ninety-six percent of the greenhouse gas emissions that 
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INTERGOV’TL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE AND LAND: SUMMARY FOR 
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the project alternative does.343 BLM then reported only the net (action minus “no 
action”) greenhouse gas emissions for the project. 344 Even accepting BLM’s flawed 
substitution assumptions, in the “no action” alternative, production from substitute 
sources would also generate royalty and revenue for the federal government and 
states where that production occurs. But BLM did not offset its estimate of expected 
revenue by the revenue that substitute energy sources would provide, and never 
explained this inconsistency. In calculating an estimated forty-three billion in 
royalties, BLM used total production figures, did not apply any substitution analysis, 
and did not assume that increased production from the Refuge would offset other 
sources of energy.345 The result was an unexplained, inconsistent approach to 
projected economic benefits versus climate change costs.346 BLM painted the project 
as conferring nearly all upside in the form of revenue, with miniscule climate change 
costs.  
In the Willow Master Plan EIS, BLM likewise found that absent any 
leasing in the region, substitute sources of oil and gas would be produced 
elsewhere.347 But again, BLM failed to apply this substitution analysis to the 
economic benefits, thus inflating the plan’s projected benefits relative to its 
environmental costs.348 As the next section describes, courts have found similar 
illogical assumptions and errors to be arbitrary and capricious.   
C. Case Precedent  
NEPA analyses in which agencies fail to conduct any modeling yet find 
perfect substitution are the simplest for legal challengers—and courts—to point to as 
implausible and thereby arbitrary and capricious. Where agencies do conduct energy 
market modeling, courts are more apt to defer to agencies’ technical judgment.  
As early as 2003, the Eighth Circuit held that federal agencies have an 
obligation to assess indirect emissions for fossil-fuel related projects and to make 
accurate energy market substitution assumptions. In Mid-States Coalition for Progress 
v. Surface Transportation Board, the court considered the Surface Transportation 
Board’s (“the Board”) approval of 280 miles of new railroad lines and upgrade of 
existing railroad lines that would allow coal from the Powder River Basin in 
 
343. Id. at 3-8.   
344. See id. tbls.3–4.  
345. Letter from Env’t. Def. Fund, Inst. for Pol’y Integrity, Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr., Union of 
Concerned Scientists & The Wilderness Soc’y, Comments on Failure to Monetize Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
in Coastal Plain Oil & Gas Leasing Program Draft EIS 9–20 (Mar. 13, 2019), 
https://policyintegrity.org/documents/Coastal_Plains_ANWR_Joint_SCC_Comments_20119.3.13-
final.pdf.  
346. See id.  
347. WILLOW PLAN DEIS, supra note 318, at 25–26. 
348. See id. at 124, tbl.3.15.3 (providing total government revenues from the plan). 
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Wyoming to be transported to power plants.349 The Board argued that coal would be 
produced regardless of whether the rail lines were built. And even if the railroad did 
induce some coal production, the Board reasoned, the extent of the effect would be 
too speculative to include in its EIS.350 The court disagreed. Although the extent of 
the induced coal production might be uncertain, the nature of the effect followed 
basic economic principles of supply and demand and was thus entirely foreseeable. 
The court explained: “[t]he increased availability of inexpensive coal will at the very 
least make coal a more attractive option to future entrants into the utilities market 
when compared with other potential fuel sources, such as nuclear power, solar power, 
or natural gas.”351 This increased competitiveness would surely increase the nation’s 
demand for coal; thus, the court concluded that the NEPA analyses must account for 
increased indirect emissions.352   
As a result of the Eighth Circuit decision, the Board prepared a 
supplemental EIS in 2005 that used the NEMS model to project changes to coal 
supply and demand and related emissions associated with the rail project.353 The 
model projected that coal use would increase by less than one percent as a result of 
the rail lines, so the Board approved the project. In a subsequent legal challenge, the 
Eighth Circuit upheld the Board’s supplemental EIS.354 
In the litigation concerning BLM’s approval of the Wright Area leases, the 
Tenth Circuit applied similar reasoning as the Eighth Circuit to conclude that BLM’s 
assumption of perfect substitution ran counter to the basic economic principles of 
supply and demand and the empirical state of knowledge concerning the U.S. coal 
market.355 In its NEPA analysis, BLM stated, absent any supporting evidence, that: 
“[d]enying this proposed coal leasing is not likely to affect current or future domestic 
coal consumption used for electric generation.”356 The court disagreed. It reasoned 
that in the “no action” alternative, removing over twenty percent of annual U.S. 
production would be a non-marginal change that would affect overall coal prices, 
demand, and greenhouse gas emissions. The court found BLM’s “blanket assertion 
that coal would be substituted from other sources[] unsupported by hard data” and 
held that BLM did not provide sufficient information to permit a reasoned choice 
between alternatives.357  
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Perhaps most strikingly, the Tenth Circuit stated that even if BLM had 
data to support its assertion, it “would still conclude this perfect substitution 
assumption arbitrary and capricious because the assumption itself is irrational (i.e., 
contrary to basic supply and demand principles).”358 The court noted that it did not 
owe BLM any special deference, distinguishing the case at hand from the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Baltimore Gas & Electric Company v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, which upheld the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s conclusion that 
permanent nuclear waste storage would not have a significant environmental 
impact.359 In Baltimore Gas, the Supreme Court noted that courts are more deferential 
to agency decisions when they are based on the agency’s “special expertise, at the 
frontiers of science.”360 The Tenth Circuit stated that climate science “is not a 
scientific frontier,” and therefore, found no reason to defer to BLM’s judgment.361 
Moreover, the court noted that “climate modeling technology exists: the NEMS 
program is available for the BLM to use,” yet the agency failed to use it.362   
Similarly, in Sabal Trail, discussed previously in Parts II and III,363 the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals rejected FERC’s argument that it need not quantify 
combustion emissions in a natural gas pipeline review because some of the natural 
gas would replace dirtier fossil fuels, thereby offsetting the project’s emissions 
estimates.364 FERC argued that it was impossible to know exactly what quantity of 
greenhouse gases would be emitted as a result of the project being approved and also 
argued that some natural gas from the pipeline would offset dirtier coal power.365 
The court found that a purely qualitative analysis of substitution was inadequate 
because “[a]n agency decisionmaker reviewing this EIS would . . . have no way of 
knowing whether total emissions, on net, will be reduced or increased by this project, 
or what degree of reduction or increase will be.”366 The court concluded that the 
agency failed to discuss the “significance” of the indirect and cumulative climate 
change effects.367 Notwithstanding the D.C. Circuit opinion in Sabal Trail, FERC 
has continued to claim that it is impossible to measure the upstream and downstream 
emissions associated with its pipeline approvals.368  
 
358. Id. at 1236.  
359. 462 U.S. 87, 104–06 (1983).  
360. Id. at 103.  
361. WildEarth Guardians, 870 F.3d at 1237. 
362. Id.  
363. See supra Parts II & III.  
364. Sierra Club v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 867 F.3d 1357, 1363 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
365. Sierra Club, 867 F.3d at 1364, 1373-75. 
366. Id. at 1375. 
367. Id. at 1374 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1502.16(b); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7). 
368. See, e.g., Pamela King, Pipelines: Climate Impacts are ‘Virtually Unknowable’—FERC, E&E NEWS 
(Jan. 28, 2019) https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060118701.  
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A second category of cases addresses agencies’ failure to apply substitution 
analysis evenly to a project’s costs and benefits. In Montana Environmental 
Information Center v. U.S. Office of Surface Mining, the District Court of Montana 
scrutinized the Office of Surface Mining’s EA for a coal mining plan, which applied 
substitution analysis to reported greenhouse gas emissions, while touting the plan’s 
revenue benefits without accounting for any substitution.369 The court held that this 
“places the Enforcement Office’s thumb on the scale by inflating the benefits of the 
action while minimizing its impacts.”370 The court described the fallacy of all upside 
as “the kind of “[i]naccurate economic information” that “may defeat the purpose of 
[NEPA analysis] by impairing the agency’s consideration of the 
adverse environmental effects and by skewing the public's evaluation of the proposed 
agency action.”371   
In a third category of cases, courts have examined agency NEPA analyses 
involving energy substitution where agencies did use energy market models. In such 
cases, courts have generally shown deference to agencies with respect to modeling 
choices and assumptions. This illustrates a potential double-edged sword of energy 
market modeling: while modeling can provide more realistic energy market 
scenarios—which is a useful and a positive development, in general—agencies can 
also hide behind complex, technical choices and thereby become more immunized 
from judicial reproach.   
In Sierra Club v. U.S. Department of Energy, the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals upheld the Department of Energy’s authorization of the export of liquefied 
natural gas from the Freeport Terminal in Texas, rejecting claims that the 
Department had not sufficiently examined greenhouse gases under NEPA because it 
relied on a lifecycle emissions report that omitted renewable energy as a substitute 
fuel source.372 The court dismissed petitioner’s argument as mere “flyspecking” and 
deferred to the Department.373 Similarly, a federal district court deferred to the 
Forest Service’s modeling and technical assumptions in a case concerning the 
adequacy of the agency’s NEPA analysis for coal leases.374  
 However, at least one court has scrutinized—and found lacking—agency 
reliance on outdated energy market information. In Indigenous Environmental Network 
 
369. 274 F. Supp. 3d 1074, 1098–99 (D. Mont. 2017).   
370. Id.   
371. Id. (citing Nat. Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 421 F.3d 797, 811 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(finding Forest Service's reliance on mistaken market demand projections that inflated the economic 
benefits and discounted the environmental impacts of revision of the Tongass Land Management Plan 
violated NEPA)). 
372. 867 F.3d 189, 194 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
373. Id. (citing Myersville Citizens for a Rural Cmty., Inc. v. FERC, 783 F.3d 1301, 1324 (D.C. 
Cir. 2015)). 
374. High Country Conservation Advocates v. U.S. Forest Serv., 333 F. Supp. 3d 1107, 1129 (D. 
Colo. 2018).  




v. U.S. Department of State, plaintiffs alleged that the State Department violated 
NEPA when issuing a Presidential Permit to allow construction of the cross-border 
Keystone XL oil pipeline.375 The court found that the Department failed to address 
“significant changes in oil prices that have occurred since 2014” and thus failed to 
satisfy NEPA’s hard look requirement.376 The court also noted that the EPA called 
upon the Department to revisit the EIS’s conclusions after oil prices dropped.377 The 
court held that this information was material to the Department’s consideration of 
Keystone’s impact on tar sands oil production, and enjoined construction and 
operation of the pipeline until the EIS could be supplemented.378 
 These cases illustrate that courts are willing and able to scrutinize agencies’ 
unsupported claims of perfect substitution and “all upside.” However, courts are less 
willing to overturn agencies’ technical judgments, especially where there is evidence 
that an agency gave logical reasons for rejecting a challenger’s preferred approach.379   
D. Solutions for Governmental Agencies 
Based on our scrutiny of past agency energy substitution analysis and court 
decisions, some principles for conducting proper substitution analysis emerge.  
First, agencies should use accurate models and the most up-to-date energy 
market information available, including for renewable energy sources. Agencies 
should carefully model alternative scenarios and their resulting production, 
emissions, and other impacts. Models should account for renewable energy and 
increased energy conservation, both of which often act as substitutes for fossil fuel 
production.  
Three sophisticated models are already used by federal agencies, and can be 
used to conduct this analysis: MarketSim, NEMS, and IPM.380 BOEM’s MarketSim 
“is a relatively simple partial-equilibrium model of U.S. energy markets” that 
“models the supply and demand of multiple energy resources (coal, natural gas, oil) 
and energy use by four domestic sectors (residential, commercial, industrial, and 
transportation) at the national scale.”381 The EIA’s NEMS “is a general equilibrium 
 
375. Indigenous Env’t. Network v. U.S. Dep't of State, 347 F. Supp. 3d 561, 576 (D. Mont. 2018).  
376. Indigenous Env’t., 347 F. Supp. 3d at 576. 
377. Id. at 577.  
378. Id. at 577, 591.  
379. E.g., Sierra Club v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 867 F.3d 1357, 1367-68 (D.C. Cir. 2017) 
(“The role of the courts in reviewing agency compliance with NEPA is accordingly limited…The 
overarching question is whether an EIS's deficiencies are significant enough to undermine informed public 
comment and informed decisionmaking”); see also Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 
462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983) (noting that courts are more deferential to agency decisions when they are based 
on the agency’s “special expertise, at the frontiers of science”).  
380. HOWARD, MODELING CHOICE, supra note 282, at 2. 
381. Id. at 6. 
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electricity model” (energy inputs, electricity, transportation and transmission) set in 
the context of a macro-economy and global electricity market to capture feedbacks 
and interactions.382 And ICF International’s Integrated Planning Model (IPM) “is a 
linear programming model” that “captures [several] aspects of the power sector, 
including [energy inputs,] generation, transmission, and dispatch.”383 Like NEMS, 
IPM models energy substitutes (coal, natural gas, oil, and renewables) and 
combustion emissions.384 Agencies should disclose the limitations of the models they 
use, make all inputs and data publicly available, and conduct sensitivity analysis for 
key parameters. It may be preferable to use multiple models to balance the tradeoffs 
of each model.385 Moreover, as a baseline, agencies should model at least two policy 
scenarios: one taking the “constant fossil fuel demand” approach and the other based 
upon fossil fuel consumption projections consistent with limiting global warming to 
1.5 or 2-degrees Celsius.386 It is irrational—and dangerous—for federal agencies to 
assume constant global fossil fuel demand decades into the future as the baseline for 
energy modeling.   
Second, where estimates are uncertain, agencies should provide a range of 
likely emissions, from the highest possible emissions to the lowest, rather than 
assume that emissions will be zero or de minimus due to energy substitution. This 
would help agencies measure the significance of environmental effects, as the NEPA 
regulations define “significantly” by reference to both context and intensity.387 As a 
default upper bound on greenhouse gas emissions, agencies should assume no energy 
substitution: that 100 percent of the resource will be produced and consumed, and that 
all of this resource is additional to a no action baseline. For instance, as discussed in Parts 
II and III, as an upper-bound estimate, it would be reasonable for FERC to assume 
that a pipeline will continuously transport 100 percent of its capacity, that all 
transported gas will be combusted, and that all combusted gas is additional and 
displaces no other fuels. FERC has called this a “full burn” assumption.388  
A full burn assumption is consistent with analyses prepared by other 
agencies. In 2017, BLM and the Office of Surface Mining issued an EA for a federal 
coal lease modification where the agencies “assume[d] that the remaining portion of 
the maximum year coal to be shipped . . . is eventually combusted.”389 The State 
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384. Id. at 11. 
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386. See supra notes 19 through 21 and accompanying body text. 
387. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27. 
388. E.g., Sabal Trail Remand Order, 162 FERC ¶ 61,233, 2018 WL 1364645, at *6–8. (Mar. 14, 
2018). 
389. See BLM, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, DOI-BLM-CO-S010-2011-0074-EA 81 (2017), 
https://bit.ly/2ufWNSL.   




Department provided a similar upper bound analysis in its 2014 Final EIS for the 
Keystone XL Pipeline, calculating lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions from the 
pipeline based on “the maximum throughput of the proposed project (830,000 bpd), 
assuming operation over the full 365 days in a year.”390 
If an agency also provides a lower bound estimate of emissions, rather than 
assuming perfect or near-perfect substitution, it should accurately account for global 
energy market dynamics. One recent economic study suggests that, for oil projects, 
it would be reasonable to assume eighty percent substitution under conditions of low 
oil prices and forty percent substitution under conditions of high oil prices.391 This 
is far lower than the ninety-five percent or higher assumed substitution used in recent 
EISs for offshore leasing and drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. And in 
fact, the State Department recently used these assumptions in its 2019 Draft 
Supplemental EIS for the Keystone XL pipeline. The Department modeled a range 
of greenhouse gas impacts under four different substitution assumptions: no 
substitution (an upper bound); eighty percent substitution under conditions of low 
oil prices; forty percent substitution under conditions of high oil prices; and complete 
substitution.392 While including a full-substitution scenario is still problematic, this 
is a vast improvement over the practice of other agencies.  
However, the State Department’s 2019 EIS for the Keystone XL pipeline 
erred by not applying any substitution to the project’s economic effects, thus 
displaying the fallacy of “all upside.” 393 This underscores a final principle of proper 
energy substitution analysis: agencies should apply substitution analysis evenly 
across environmental and economic costs and benefits. This can be accomplished by 
applying the same range of realistic substitution scenarios to revenue and other 
benefits that agencies apply to greenhouse gas emissions.    
By conducting energy market substitution analysis appropriately, 
decisionmakers can have a better picture of the net costs or benefits of projects, 
including climate change consequences, and disclose those consequences to the 
public. As the next Part explains, NEPA also requires agencies to use available 
metrics like the social cost of greenhouse gases to assess the significance of 
environmental impacts, especially where economic benefits are monetized.   
 
390. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR 
THE KEYSTONE XL PIPELINE tbl.4.14–8 (2014). 
391. Peter Erickson & Michael Lazarus, Would Constraining US Fossil Fuel Production Affect Global 
CO2 emissions? A Case Study of US Leasing Policy, 150 Climate Change 29, 32–33 (2018).  
392. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, DRAFT SUPPLEMENTAL ENV’T. IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE 
PROPOSED KEYSTONE XL PIPELINE, DOS-2019-0033 at 4–79 (2019).  
393. See id. at 4–62, 4–63, 4–64 (stating economic benefits without acknowledging that these 
projections represent an upper bound, absent any substitution). 
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V. THE SOCIAL COST OF CARBON: PLACING A DOLLAR VALUE ON 
EXPECTED CLIMATE DAMAGES 
Even where agencies do attempt to quantify greenhouse emissions in 
NEPA analyses, they often chronically undervalue the cost to society of those 
emissions, frequently treating the cost as zero. The result is a skewed analysis that 
makes the economic benefits of projects look much greater than the costs. Agencies 
can remedy this by using available tools like the Interagency Working Group’s social 
cost of greenhouse gases metric.394 
A. What Is the Social Cost of Carbon?  
The social cost of greenhouse gases “is an estimate, in dollars, of the 
economic damages that result from emitting one additional ton of greenhouse gases 
into the atmosphere.”395 The social cost of carbon dioxide (“SCC”) and social cost of 
methane are the two most commonly used metrics, each of which place a dollar value 
on the most significant, quantifiable damages caused by each additional ton of carbon 
dioxide or methane emitted, respectively. These metrics translate the effects of 
climate change into U.S. dollars, in order to help policymakers and stakeholders 
understand the economic impacts of decisions that will increase or decrease 
greenhouse gas emissions.396  
Translating the abstract concept of metric tons of carbon dioxide into a 
dollar figure makes climate change costs much more tangible and easier to compare 
to other quantified project costs and benefits, such as revenue or jobs. For instance, 
one million metric tons of carbon dioxide is equivalent to approximately $53 million 
in climate damages using a 3% discount rate.397 Moreover, merely disclosing a 
project’s aggregate greenhouse gas emissions in NEPA analysis does not actually 
describe the climate change consequences—including physical effects on the ground. 
By using the social cost of greenhouse gases to place a dollar figure on the most salient 
damages, stakeholders can much more easily grasp the degree of harm associated with 
 
394. INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON SOCIAL COST OF CARBON, TECHNICAL SUPPORT 
DOCUMENT: SOCIAL COST OF CARBON FOR REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS UNDER EXECUTIVE 
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emissions, and better measure the significance of environmental effects.398 For these 
reasons, the metric is used by local, state, and federal governments to inform billions 
of dollars of policy and investment decisions in the United States and abroad.399 
The metric was developed by an Interagency Working Group (“Working 
Group”) convened in 2009 by President Obama.400 The group was assembled in 
response to a Ninth Circuit ruling requiring the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration to account for the economic effects of the reduction in CO2 emissions 
in its analysis of national fuel economy standards.401  
As defined by the Working Group, the social cost of greenhouse gases is 
“intended to include (but not limited to) changes in net agricultural productivity, 
human health, property damages from increased flood risk, and the value of 
ecosystem services.”402 The Working Group developed the SCC values using the 
three most widely cited, peer-reviewed climate economic impact models that link 
physical impacts to the economic damages of CO2 emissions.403 These three 
integrated assessment models, PAGE, FUND, and DICE, produce a value for three 
different discount rates: 2.5%, 3%, and 5%.404 The Working Group gives each model 
equal weight in developing the values. Discount rates allow economists to measure 
the value of money over time—the tradeoff between what a dollar is worth today and 
what a dollar would be worth in the future.405 Higher discount rates result in a lower 
SCC; if future climate damages are discounted at a high rate, we would be placing 
less value on avoiding those damages today.406 In 2020, the SCC estimates are $15, 
$53, and $78 per metric ton of CO2, measured in 2020 dollars.407 The 3% discount 
rate is described as the “central value,” corresponding to $53 per metric ton of carbon 
 
398. See, e.g., William D. Nordhaus, Revisiting the Social Cost of Carbon, 114 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 
1518, 1518 (2017) (“The social cost of carbon (SCC) is a central concept for understanding and 
implementing climate change policies.”). 
399. Rennent and Kingdon, supra note 41; Iliana Paul et al., INST. FOR POL’Y INTEGRITY, THE 
SOCIAL COST OF GREENHOUSE GASES AND STATE POLICY: A FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 
GUIDE (2017), http://policyintegrity.org/files/publications/SCC_State_Guidance.pdf (describing state 
uses of the metric). 
400. INST. FOR POL’Y INTEGRITY, SOCIAL COSTS OF GREENHOUSE GASES 2 (2017),
www.policyintegrity.org /files/publications/Social_Cost_of_Greenhouse_Gases_Factsheet.pdf.  
401. Id.; see also Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. NHTSA, 538 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2008).  
402. TSD 2010, supra note 394, at 1.  
403. Id. at 5. 
404. Id.; see also TSD 2016, supra note 397.  
405. INST. FOR POL’Y INTEGRITY, SOCIAL COSTS OF GREENHOUSE GASES, supra note 400, at 4. 
406. Id. 
407. TSD 2016, supra note 397, at 4 (placing the 2020 SCC values at $12, $42, $62 in 2007 dollars). 
The numbers in the main text have been updated to 2020 dollars to account for inflation.  
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dioxide in 2020.408 The Working Group’s social cost of greenhouse gases is 
considered to be a lower bound estimate of climate damages, as it omits certain effects 
that are more difficult to measure.409 
While agencies frequently used the social cost of greenhouse gases during 
the Obama Administration in regulatory impact analyses (cost benefit analysis 
prepared by federal agencies in rulemakings) and sometimes in NEPA analyses, in 
2017 the Trump administration withdrew all SCC guidance and technical documents 
as “no longer representative of government policy.”410 The Trump administration 
also disbanded the Working Group that had developed the metric.411  
In October 2017, the Environmental Protection Agency issued interim 
social cost of carbon values of approximately $1 and $7, in 2020 dollars.412 The SCC 
values decreased so markedly because EPA applied higher discount rates (3% and 
7%) and incorporated the domestic impacts associated with carbon emissions, only, 
rather than the global impacts.413 While a critique of the interim domestic value is 
beyond the scope of this article, the Trump administration’s changes to the metric 
have been widely criticized by economists and legal scholars.414 
B. Regulatory Approach to Monetizing Emissions  
NEPA itself is silent with respect to cost-benefit analysis, and NEPA’s 
implementing regulations provide that NEPA does not require a monetary cost 
benefit analysis of the alternatives considered.415 That said, nothing in the statute or 
regulations prevents agencies from monetizing effects, and agencies frequently 
monetize the expected economic benefits of projects, such as revenue.  
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Under the Obama administration, CEQ expressed support for using the 
social cost of greenhouse gases in NEPA analysis, describing the Working Group’s 
metric as “a harmonized, interagency metric that can give decision makers and the 
public useful information.”416 However, as described in Part I, the Trump 
administration rescinded that CEQ guidance and proposed new guidance stating that 
agencies need not weigh NEPA alternatives “in a monetary cost-benefit analysis 
using any monetized Social Cost of Carbon (SCC) estimate.”417 The 2019 proposed 
guidance noted that the SCC estimates were developed for rulemakings, not NEPA 
analysis or project-level decisions.418 And teeing up a potential conflict with legal 
precedent, CEQ further stated that, “[m]onetization or quantification of some 
aspects of an agency’s analysis does not require that all effects, including potential 
effects of GHG emissions, be monetized or quantified.”419  
As a result of the change in guidance, agencies are left to decide whether to 
cease using the metric at all, whether to use the “domestic only” interim value, or 
whether to use the Working Group’s global value. In the absence of federal 
institutional support for the social cost of greenhouse gases metric in NEPA analysis, 
agencies have expressed growing reluctance to use it in environmental reviews. But 
by retreating from monetizing climate damages, agencies are also rolling the dice 
with respect to litigation.  
In its 2019 draft EIS for the Willow Master Development Plan, which 
describes planned oil and gas drilling, BLM failed to use the SCC to monetize any 
climate damages.420 BLM stated that it is “not currently possible to determine the 
[climate] impact of a single project.”421 Of course, BLM overlooked the social cost of 
greenhouse gases metric, which was designed to monetize the incremental impact of 
as little as one metric ton of carbon dioxide. In the EIS, BLM also monetized a 
number of effects, including tax revenue and royalties from fossil fuel production, 
yet failed to treat expected climate costs with proportional rigor by translating them 
into a dollar figure.422 The end result is an EIS that gives BLM and the public 
essentially no information on whether the climate damages are significant, despite 
the existence of the social cost of greenhouse gases as an appropriate and accessible 
metric that can help assess the significance of emissions by presenting them in dollar 
terms.  
 
416. Memorandum from Council on Env’t. Quality, Final Guidance for Federal Departments and 
Agencies on Consideration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and the Effects of Climate Change in National 
Environmental Policy Act Reviews 33 n.86 (2016).  
417. Draft National Environmental Policy Act Guidance on Consideration of Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions, 84 Fed. Reg. 30,097, 30,098 (June 26, 2019). 
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In its Final EIS for leasing in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, BLM 
likewise failed to use the social cost of greenhouse gases metric.423 Yet, BLM 
monetized many of the lease sales’ expected monetary benefits, including property 
taxes and mineral royalties, thereby “placing its thumb on the scale” in favor of more 
leasing.424 The agency made several dubious arguments to justify its decision to not 
monetize emissions, including that the SCC was developed for rulemakings only, 
that BLM did not provide a “complete monetary cost-benefit analysis,” and that the 
SCC “does not measure the actual incremental impacts of a project on the 
environment.”425 Each of these arguments is easily refuted: many federal and state 
agencies use the metric in environmental impact reviews;426 BLM presented a 
misleading analysis by quantifying the economic impacts yet omitting climate 
damages;427 and the metric was designed to measure incremental impacts.428 
Applying a back-of-the-envelope calculation, BLM’s leasing plan is projected to 
cause more than $265 million per year in climate damages, but the public would have 
no way of knowing this by reviewing the EIS.429   
BLM is not alone in its failure to use the social cost of greenhouse gases 
metric. Recall the extensive EIS prepared by BOEM for its five-year offshore 
drilling program, described in Part IV.430 The agency is instructed by statute to 
conduct an analysis somewhat akin to a cost benefit analysis, “selecting the timing 
and location of leasing, to the maximum extent practicable, so as to obtain a proper 
balance between the potential for environmental damage, the potential for the 
discovery of oil and gas, and the potential for adverse impact on the coastal zone.”431 
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However, the agency’s 2016 net benefits analysis omitted the costs associated with 
greenhouse gas emissions from oil and gas production, transport, processing, and 
consumption.432 The agency explained: “[a] key reason for not incorporating these 
costs is that benefits and costs in the net benefits analysis are appropriately assessed 
at the domestic or national level, not at a global scale.”433 Of course, this argument 
ignores that climate costs are borne internationally, and even climate effects in 
foreign countries harm U.S. economic and security interests.434 For this reason, the 
Working Group developed a global social cost of greenhouse gases for use in 
domestic policy creation.435  
BOEM, however, has not been internally consistent with respect to its use 
of the social cost of greenhouse gases. In a 2017 EIS for an offshore development 
plan, it explained that the social cost of carbon was “a useful measure to assess the 
benefits of CO2 reductions and inform agency decisions” and used it to monetize the 
emissions difference between the proposed oil and gas project and the no-action 
baseline.436 BOEM does not appear to have used the SCC in any subsequent NEPA 
analyses. 
In short, agencies have shown growing reluctance to use the social cost of 
greenhouse gases metric in NEPA analysis during the Trump Administration, 
perhaps in light of CEQ’s revised guidance that counsels against the use of this 
tool.437 The next section considers whether the agencies’ failure to monetize climate 
effects may make them more vulnerable to legal challenges.  
C. Case Precedent  
Despite the move away from the social cost of greenhouse gases protocol 
by federal agencies, NEPA and decades of legal precedent interpreting the statute 
make clear that agencies must describe the “actual environmental effects” of actions 
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and alternatives in a way that “brings those effects to bear on decisions.”438 Courts 
review agency compliance with NEPA by assessing whether they have taken a “hard 
look” at the effects of alternatives.439 Moreover, information presented in EISs and 
EAs “cannot be misleading.”440 Because economic benefits are often presented using 
dollar figures, some courts have held that it is misleading to fail to also monetize 
climate change costs, especially where the social cost of greenhouse gases is an 
available, peer-reviewed metric that provides an estimate of climate damages.441 That 
said, as Part IV on energy substitution made clear, courts often defer to agencies 
when they make choices that depend upon their technical or scientific expertise; the 
use of the metric (or refusal to do so) has been interpreted by some, but not all, courts 
as falling into this category.442  
Before discussing illustrative NEPA cases, one important decision 
addressed the legality of agencies relying upon the global social cost of greenhouse 
gases. In 2016, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the 
Department of Energy’s use of the metric in its analysis of a rule setting energy 
efficiency standards for commercial refrigerators pursuant to the Energy Policy and 
Conservation Act.443 In Zero-Zone, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Energy, the court 
considered an industry-led challenge to the Department’s energy efficiency standards 
that the agency justified, in part, by quantifying and monetizing the environmental 
benefits of the standards using the SCC.444 Petitioners alleged that agency’s analysis 
was arbitrary and capricious because it used the global SCC value to assess projected 
climate benefits, but only assessed national costs.445 The court upheld the 
Department’s use of the global social cost of greenhouse gases over these objections, 
finding that the agency adequately explained its rationale for relying on the global 
value because climate change is a “global externality.”446 The Department relied on 
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the Working Group’s technical documents to support its use of the metric.447 Because 
these documents have been withdrawn by the Trump administration,448 it is less clear 
how a court presented with a similar case would rule today. 
One of the most cited NEPA cases for the proposition that agencies must 
use the social cost of greenhouse gases to monetize climate damages when they 
describe other project effects in dollar terms is the 2014 decision in High Country 
Conservation Advocates v. U.S. Forest Service.449 BLM and the Forest Service argued 
that it was sufficient to quantify expected emissions relative to state and national 
emissions and provide a general discussion of the impacts of climate change.450 The 
agencies did not discuss the impacts caused by the project’s expected emissions, and 
claimed “that such an analysis is impossible.”451 The court disagreed, noting that 
while the SCC was designed to assist agencies in cost-benefit analyses associated with 
rulemakings, “EPA has expressed support for its use in other contexts.”452 Moreover, 
the agencies did monetize climate change costs using the protocol in the draft EIS 
for the project, but they removed that analysis prior to the final EIS while retaining 
monetization of the project’s benefits, such as coal royalties.453 The court held that 
the agencies did not offer a non-arbitrary reason to exclude the SCC from the final 
analysis and, moreover, relied upon the economic benefits of the project in selecting 
their chosen alternative.454  
In 2017, in Montana Environmental Information Center v. U.S. Office of Surface 
Mining, the U.S. District Court of Montana found that the agency engaged in a 
“socioeconomic analysis” of the benefits associated with a mining plan proposal and 
held that the agency was putting its “thumb on the scale” by failing to monetize the 
climate damages associated with greenhouse gas emissions.455 In the EA, the Office 
of Surface Mining concluded that the plan would generate a $400,000 monthly 
payroll in Montana and contribute $21.8 million per year in tax revenue to the 
states.456 The agency quantified the greenhouse gas emissions associated with the 
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project and compared them to total U.S. emissions, but it failed to monetize them. 
The court concluded that quantifying the benefits but not the climate change costs 
was arbitrary and capricious, especially when the social cost of greenhouse gases was 
available.457  
And in 2020, the Northern District of California cited similar failings when 
vacating a BLM regulation weakening Obama-era standards for methane venting 
from natural gas and oil production.458 Although the agency quantified methane 
emissions, it failed to communicate the “actual environmental effects” of the 
emissions, instead invoking the frivolous fraction fallacy to dismiss climate 
concerns.459 BLM attempted to trivialize climate impacts by explaining that the 
project’s effects would amount to less than one percent of total United States 
methane emissions.460 Rejecting this comparison as unhelpful in capturing the 
cumulative effects of such projects, the court explained that “[m]ere quantification 
[of emissions] is insufficient” to satisfy a hard look standard.461 Moreover, the court 
said that although NEPA does not require a particular type of methodology for 
assessing climate impacts, BLM could not ignore available scientific tools for 
assessment, like the social cost of methane, by claiming climate effects were not 
foreseeable.462 The failure to use the Working Group’s social cost of methane not 
only failed NEPA, but also contaminated the agency’s cost-benefit analysis, 
according to the court, making the agency’s analysis arbitrary and capricious.463 
Notwithstanding an executive order by the Trump administration to abandon the 
Working Group’s global social cost of methane, the court concluded that “the 
President did not alter by fiat what constitutes the best available science,” and 
therefore could not absolve agencies of statutory responsibilities to accurately 
evaluate a rule’s effects through methods like the Working Group’s social cost of 
methane.464 The court rejected BLM’s use of an interim “domestic only” social cost 
of methane, which was not peer-reviewed and ignored climate harms to Americans 
abroad, foreign American-owned assets, and harms to all Americans from reduced 
geopolitical security.465 
Other federal courts have been less willing to overturn agency NEPA 
analyses even where some economic benefits are monetized but climate change costs 
are not, though. In 2018, in Wilderness Workshop v. Bureau of Land Management, the 
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District Court of Colorado held that estimates of average annual labor income and 
royalty distributions did not constitute the “benefit” side of a cost-benefit analysis.466 
Further, the court stated that because BLM did not “expressly rely” on the cited 
economic benefits in the plan, it held that BLM’s failure to monetize climate damages 
was not arbitrary and capricious.467 The court thus narrowed the application of High 
Country.  
One year later, in WildEarth Guardians v. Zinke, the District Court of the 
District of Columbia noted that the EAs at issue, for a series of oil and gas lease sales, 
discussed economic benefits in a manner that was “abbreviated and involved little 
quantification,” distinguishing the facts at hand from those in High Country.468 
However, the EAs did cite dollar figures for projected lease sales. Nonetheless, the 
court held that “the EAs’ cursory discussion of the economic benefits of oil and gas 
development” did not obligate BLM to monetize climate change effects at the leasing 
stage.469 The court held that BLM provided a reasoned explanation for declining to 
use the social cost of carbon protocol; namely that, “calculating the [social cost of 
carbon] from CO2 emissions from the combustion of an unknown quantity of 
produced oil and gas would be highly speculative.”470  
Finally, in 2016, in EarthReports v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the 
D.C. Circuit considered whether FERC needed to use the social cost of greenhouse 
gases or a comparable tool when assessing emissions that would result from the 
construction and operation of a liquefied natural gas export facility.471 FERC stated 
that it would not use such a metric because: (1) “lack of consensus on the appropriate 
discount rate leads to significant variation in output;” (2) it does not measure the 
actual incremental impacts of a project on the environment; and (3) “there are no 
established criteria identifying the monetized values that are to be considered 
significant for NEPA purposes.”472 Notably, the underlying EA did monetize several 
project benefits, such as tax and business sale revenue, without monetizing any 
climate damages.473 However, the court upheld FERC’s decision.474 The D.C. 
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Circuit has repeatedly cited EarthReports in rejecting arguments for applying the 
social cost of greenhouse gases in FERC’s environmental reviews.475 
In short, many—but not all—courts examining agency NEPA analyses have 
deferred to agency’s judgments as to whether to use the Working Group’s social cost 
of greenhouse gases. They have been more willing to overturn agencies’ failure to use 
the metric where an agency monetized some benefits of the project, but not climate 
costs. But courts have not been consistent on this point over time and across 
jurisdictions. The result is less a “bright line” rule for when agencies must use the 
social cost of greenhouse gases and more a general rule of thumb for agency best 
practice in order to reduce legal risk.     
D. Solutions for Government Agencies  
Monetizing climate damages fulfills an agency’s legal obligations under 
NEPA in ways that simple quantification of tons of greenhouse gas emissions cannot. 
As described earlier in this Article, climate change is a “death by a thousand cuts 
problem,” and this problem is exacerbated when agencies fail to use available tools 
that provide meaningful context for emissions. In 2014 alone, the extraction and 
combustion of fossil fuels from federal lands produced 1,279 million metric tons of 
CO2, which amounts to 23% of U.S. total CO2 emissions and more than $67 billion 
in climate damages.476 It is generally easier to comprehend climate damages when 
presented in dollar terms. This makes our recommendation for agencies 
straightforward: use the global social cost of greenhouse gases in NEPA analyses.  
The U.S. Supreme Court has called the disclosure of impacts the “key 
requirement of NEPA,” and held that agencies must “consider and disclose the actual 
environmental effects” of a proposed action in a way that “brings those effects to bear 
on [the agency’s] decisions.”477 Moreover, NEPA requires a “reasonably thorough 
discussion” and “necessary contextual information” on real-world climate impacts 
and their significance, which the social cost of greenhouse gases provides.478 
The “actual environmental effects” of emitting greenhouse gases are the 
incremental climate impacts caused by those emissions, including: property lost or 
damaged by sea-level rise, coastal storms, flooding, and other extreme weather 
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events; lost productivity and other impacts to agriculture, forestry, and fisheries; 
human health impacts, including cardiovascular and respiratory mortality from heat-
related illnesses, changing disease; and changes in fresh water availability, to name 
just a few.479 While a lower bound estimate, the social cost of greenhouse gases was 
designed specifically to capture the aggregate cost of such impacts. 
Agencies should monetize climate costs using the social cost of greenhouse 
gases in all NEPA analysis in order to provide a meaningful accounting of actual 
environmental effects. This duty becomes heightened where economic benefits are 
presented in dollar terms.480 While not all courts are uniform on this point, lopsided 
analysis that omits a thorough accounting of climate damages is precisely the kind of 
“inaccurate economic information” that may defeat the purpose of NEPA analysis 
and skew the public’s evaluation of the proposed agency action.481  
 
CONCLUSION 
The National Environmental Policy Act was designed to force federal 
agencies to think about environmental challenges. Climate change is the greatest 
environmental challenge of our time. Yet NEPA analyses have frequently failed to 
account for projects’ climate impacts. Such failure is unacceptable. For each of the 
four areas in which NEPA analyses commonly fall short—downstream emissions, 
upstream emissions, energy substitution analysis, and monetizing emissions—
agencies already possess tools to estimate and contextualize climate impacts. Some 
courts have begun to demand more of agency climate assessments, and it is likely that 
as climate change grows direr, judges’ expectations will increase. To fulfill their duty 
to the public, agencies must fully consider the consequences of their own actions in 
contributing to the climate crisis. Only then can agencies “create and maintain 
conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony.”482 
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